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"Innocence" and the Guilty Mind
STEPHEN F. SMITH*
For decades, the "guilty mind" requirement in federal criminal law has been
understood as precluding punishment for "morally blameless" (or "innocent")
conduct, thereby ensuring that only offenders with adequate notice of the
wrongfulness of their conduct face conviction. The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Elonis v. United States portends a significant, and novel, shift in mens rea
doctrine by treating the potential for disproportionately severe punishment as an
independent justification for heightened mens rea requirements. This long-overdue
doctrinal move makes perfect sense because punishment without culpability and
excessive punishment involve the same objectionable feature: the imposition of
morally undeserved punishment.
This Article uses Elonis as a vehicle for reexamining the effectiveness of current
mens rea doctrine. Even after Elonis, mens rea doctrine remains hobbled by several
methodologicalflaws which prevent it from making moral culpability a necessary
precondition for punishment. These flaws, I argue, are traceable to the doctrine's
simultaneous embrace of two irreconcilable views of the separation of powers in
criminal law. The project of reading implied mens rea requirements into statutes
and fleshing out incomplete legislative crime definitions necessarily assumes that
courts have a lawmaking role on par with Congress. The mens rea selection
methodology, however, reflects standard faithful-agent textualism. This turns out
to be the doctrine's Achilles heel because the risk of morally undeserved punishment
stems primarily from poor legislative crime definition.
To be truly effective, mens rea doctrine must operate outside the statutory definition
of the offense. All mens rea options not clearly foreclosed by Congress-even
knowledge of criminality-must be available wherever needed to prevent morally
undeserved punishment. Until this occurs, mens rea doctrine will continue to default
on its promise of preventing conviction for morally blameless conduct, not to
mention the broader promise, suggested both by Elonis and criminal law tradition
and theory, of precluding disproportionately severe punishment.
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. For insightful comments on early drafts, I am
grateful to Richard Bonnie, Kim Forde-Mazrui, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Peter Low, and Daniel Richman.
My thinking on these issues also benefitted from conversations with faculty workshop participants at
the College of William & Mary, Notre Dame, Pepperdine, and Universityof San Diego law schools. Any
errors herein are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Under what circumstances can the expression of an idea in terms
others might deem threatening result in criminal punishment? The
Supreme Court took up the question in Elonis v. United States.' The case
involved a self-styled "rap" artist convicted under the federal threats
statute2 for certain passages posted on his Facebook page. These
passages, said to be lyrics, arguably contained threats of bodily harm
against his former wife and others. The defense challenged the conviction
on the ground that threatening communications, no less than the
1. 135 S. Ct. 2001(2015).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (prohibiting the transmission of "any communication containing
any threat ... to injure the person of another .... ).
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burning of crosses by white supremacists in Virginia v. Black,3 are
protected speech unless made for the purpose of inspiring fear of bodily
injury.
The First Amendment issue naturally took center stage in Elonis, but
it was not the only, or even the principal, argument for reversal. Quite
apart from constitutional concerns, the defendant argued that the threats
statute requires proof that the accused acted with the specific intent to
place listeners in fear. The government, however, contended that no
intent is required for conviction. In the government's view, it is sufficient
that the defendant acted negligently, using words that a reasonable
person might view as menacing.
The Court resolved the case in the defendant's favor, but did so on
narrow grounds. Declining to reach the First Amendment issue, the
Court ruled that the threats statute demands proof of a mental state more
culpable than negligence. This includes not just purpose to cause fear,
but also knowledge that listeners would be fearful of bodily harm. The
sufficiency of recklessness to convict, and the proper definition of "true
threats" constitutionally immune from proscription,4 would have to
await another day.
Some commentators have dismissed Elonis as a missed opportunity
to provide needed guidance on an important free speech issue.5 Though
understandable, this view is mistaken. The constitutional question is,
without a doubt, important, but the decision's significance lies in the fact
that the Court did not decide the case on constitutional grounds.
By resolving the case through statutory interpretation, the Elonis
Court provided groundbreaking new guidance on federal doctrine
concerning mens rea-the vital but admittedly murky requirement that
criminal liability requires moral blameworthiness. 6 Until Elonis, the
historic requirement of mens rea was described in unduly narrow terms
3. 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (ruling that the burning of crosses as a symbol of racial hatred is
protected speech unless done with purpose to intimidate others).
4. The Court explained:
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals... . Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable
sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.
Id. at 359-60.
5. See, e.g., Joseph Russomanno, Facebook Threats: The Missed Opportunities of Elonis v.
United States, 21 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2016) (accusing the Elonis Court of "neglect of duty").
6. As a leading treatise explains: "For several centuries (at least since 16oo) the different
common law crimes have been so defined as to require, for guilt, that the defendant's acts or omissions
be accompanied by one or more of the various types of fault (intention, knowledge, recklessness
or-more rarely negligence)." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 5.5, at 381 (2d ed.
2003).
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as merely precluding punishment for "morally blameless" (or "innocent")
conduct.7 If mens rea doctrine merely required the minimally sufficient
mental state necessary to guarantee moral blameworthiness, however,
then the government would have prevailed in Elonis. After all, as the
concurrence noted, negligence is regarded as a blameworthy mental state
under both common law and the Model Penal Code.8 Nevertheless, eight
Justices agreed that negligence is insufficiently culpable to warrant
punishment under the threats statute.
This Article uses Elonis as a point of departure to assess the current
state of federal mens rea doctrine. Prior commentators have addressed a
number of the larger normative issues. These issues include whether
mens rea should be required at all9 and, if so, whether mens rea doctrine
should prevent punishment for morally blameless conduct only,1o or
guarantee both culpability and proportionality of punishment.11 Precious
little attention, however, has been given to whether or not the prevailing
federal approach to mens rea selection actually works. To put the
question slightly differently, can we be confident that mens rea doctrine
accomplishes its stated objective of preventing punishment for morally
blameless conduct?
Until now, such workability questions have largely gone
unaddressed, with scholars often simply assuming the effectiveness of
contemporary mens rea doctrine.12 These questions concerning the
7. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) ("The presumption in favor of
scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate
wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent conduct."'). As conventionally understood, "innocence"
and "blamelessness" encompass conduct that is both consistent with community standards of morality
and societal expectations about the kinds of activities that are likely to be illegal. Conduct is said to be
"blameworthy," "culpable," or "guilty" if engaged in despite notice that it is considered morally or
legally wrongful.
8. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (recognizing that negligence lies within "the hierarchy of mental states that may be
required as a condition for criminal liability .... ).
9. See, e.g., Eric A. Johnson, Rethinking the Presumption ofMens Rea, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
769 (2012).
1o. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96
MICH. L. REV. 127, 145-52 (1997); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, OfInnocence and Innocents: The
Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 859, 882-904 (1999);
John S. Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal
Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1057-1130 (1999).
11. See generally Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (2009)
(arguing that proportionality concerns should explicitly factor into federal mens rea selection).
12. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note to, at 1023 (asserting that federal mens rea doctrine "operates to
ensure that only the culpable can be criminals"). One scholar has come to the opposite conclusion
based on a survey of lower court decisions, which he views as proof that mens rea doctrine is wholly
ineffective in preventing punishment without culpability. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically
Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 137 (2007) (arguing that juries
should be allowed to determine for themselves whether, and under what circumstances, defendants
are blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment). In this Article, I attempt to navigate a middle
1612 [Vol. 69:1609
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effectiveness of mens rea doctrine have far-reaching significance. If the
doctrine satisfactorily achieves its goal, then it makes sense that the
Supreme Court has failed to heed repeated calls to treat moral
blameworthiness as a constitutional prerequisite for punishment.13
Lambert v. California,14 a case involving an ex-convict punished for
failing to register with the police upon taking up residence in Los Angeles,
took a modest first step in that direction decades ago. The Lambert Court
set aside the conviction on fair warning grounds, ruling that a failure to
register cannot be punished as blameworthy without proof the accused
actually knew of the legal duty to register. Although it seemed to
invalidate punishment without moral culpability, today Lambert
remains, as dissenting Justice Felix Frankfurter predicted, "an isolated
deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on the waters
of the law."15
For a Supreme Court that has been so insistent as of late on using
mens rea doctrine to exempt morally blameless conduct from
punishment, the demise of Lambert is easily explained. To the extent
mens rea doctrine successfully limits criminal liability to morally
blameworthy conduct, there is no need in the federal system for a
constitutional rule invalidating morally undeserved punishment. Of
course, such a rule would still retain vitality for state criminal law, but
such punishment may be much less prevalent in the state system. As
Professor William Stuntz has explained, powerful resource and political
constraints concentrate state enforcement efforts on violent and other
serious mala in se crimes, as opposed to technical offenses involving less
blameworthy offenders.16 Under these circumstances, it is hardly
surprising that Lambert remains an unfulfilled promise.
On the other hand, if mens rea doctrine fails to make moral
blameworthiness a prerequisite for criminal punishment, then the
doctrine must be viewed as a work-in-progress. At a minimum, the Court
would have to consider whether existing doctrine can be improved to
course between these positions by identifying and proposing solutions to the defects that undermine
the effectiveness of current mens rea doctrine.
13. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
653, 655-59 (2012); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, loo MICH. L. REv.
505,588-91(2002); Singer & Husak, supra note 10, at 943; John Calvin Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness,
and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71VA. L. REv. 189, 211-12 (1985).
14. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
15. Id. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As Professor William Stuntz noted, "Lambert's notice
principle has never taken off. Few decisions rest on it, and the principle itself remains an unenforced
norm, not a genuine constitutional rule." Stuntz, supra note 13, at 589. Even so, the decision continues
to capture the imagination of legal scholars. See, e.g., Peter W. Low & Benjamin Charles Wood,
Lambert Revisited, 1oo VA. L. REV. 1603,1659-62 (2014) (endorsing Lambert as an application of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine rather than a freestanding constitutional blameworthiness principle).
16. See generally Stuntz, supra note 13, at 542-46.
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deliver the desired protection against punishment without culpability.
The Court might also need to look beyond mens rea doctrine, perhaps to
a Lambert-like rule of constitutional law or revitalized Eighth
Amendment sentencing proportionality standards, for additional
safeguards against morally undeserved punishment. In order to know
whether or not additional safeguards are required, however, the
effectiveness of current mens rea doctrine must be subjected to critical
examination.
This Article proposes to do just that. Part I sets the stage by
explaining the traditional conception of the role of mens rea (and of
moral "innocence") in criminal law, as well as the contours of current
mens rea doctrine. As presently framed, mens rea doctrine seeks to
insulate morally blameless conduct from the reach of federal criminal
statutes by ensuring that offenders will not face conviction unless they
had adequate notice that their conduct was legally or morally wrongful.
If they violate a criminal law despite such notice, their actions are morally
blameworthy-"guilty"-and they are appropriate candidates for
punishment. There is, of course, the further question of how much
punishment may be imposed. Traditional federal mens rea doctrine,
however, lays that question to one side, as if the commission of a
blameworthy act justifies the imposition of unlimited punishment rather
than the level of punishment that "fits" the crime.
Part II uses the Elonis decision as a window into federal mens rea
selection. The decision blazed new trails in mens rea doctrine by treating
the potential for disproportionately severe punishment as an
independent basis for imposing heightened state-of-mind requirements.
In so ruling, the Court essentially broadened the recognized purpose of
federal mens rea doctrine. No longer does the doctrine merely aim to
prevent punishment for morally blameless conduct; it also seeks to
preclude punishment in excess of blameworthiness. This long-overdue
doctrinal move makes perfect sense because punishment without
culpability and excessive punishment both involve the same
objectionable feature: the imposition of punishment which is not morally
deserved.
Unfortunately, as potentially path-breaking as the Elonis decision
was in this respect, it otherwise conformed to the Court's familiar, self-
defeating approach to the interpretation of criminal statutes. Ironically,
the Court itself created the very problem of morally undeserved
punishment that it attempted to solve through heightened mens rea
requirements. The potential for conviction based on mere carelessness in
expression only existed because the Court brushed aside narrower
interpretations in favor of the broad view that the term "threat" includes
any statement, no matter how fanciful in context, which might portend
1614 [Vol. 69:1609
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bodily harm. In this sense, Elonis exemplifies a fundamental
contradiction in the Court's approach to federal criminal interpretation:
the Court, with good reason, frets at the mens rea stage about exempting
"innocent" conduct from punishment, yet it routinely interprets the actus
reus of federal crimes in ways that expose more conduct-"guilty" and
"innocent" alike-to prosecution.
As if that were not bad enough, the Elonis Court failed to go far
enough in its treatment of the mens rea required under the threats
statute to achieve full proportionality for punishment. As the Court
correctly recognized, felony sanctions are disproportionately severe for
people who carelessly use words that might inspire fear of bodily injury.
This line of reasoning suggests that the threats statute should be reserved
for people who intended (or at least knew) that their statements would
cause others to be afraid. Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility
that reckless disregard of the potential for causing fear may result in
conviction, in violation not just of proportionality concerns but also
potentially the First Amendment itself.
Part III, the centerpiece of this Article, examines the effectiveness of
the current approach to mens rea selection. Is it sufficient to accomplish
the goal of precluding punishment for morally blameless acts?
Unfortunately, the doctrine is not nearly as efficacious as courts and
commentators suppose. The doctrine is a considerable improvement
over the ad hoc approach it replaced, but it nonetheless fails to ensure
that federal criminal liability will track moral blameworthiness.
Even aside from the glaring absence of proportionality
considerations as a recognized factor in mens rea selection prior to
Elonis, the Court's current method for determining mens rea issues is
hobbled by several methodological flaws. Even at its most aggressive,
federal mens rea doctrine operates within the legislative definition of the
crime. No matter how essential it maybe in particular contexts to exempt
blameless conduct from punishment, courts cannot require proof that
offenders knew their conduct was illegal absent statutory text making
knowledge of the law relevant to the definition of the offense. Even more
conventional mens rea requirements (such as purpose or knowledge)
cannot be imposed where courts deem them impliedly precluded by the
wording or structure of the statute of conviction or related statutes. The
doctrine thus hinges the availability of implied mens rea requirements
on the presence of textual cues from Congress rather than the overriding
need to prevent morally undeserved punishment.
This feature of existing doctrine turns out to be its Achilles heel. That
is so because the effectiveness of mens rea requirements in limiting
conviction to morally blameworthy conduct depends on the fortuity of
how particular crimes are worded and structured. Given that risks of
August 2018] 1615
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morally undeserved punishment stem primarily from poor legislative
crime definition, mens rea doctrine can be effective only if it operates
outside the statutory definition of the offense. That is to say, the
controlling consideration in prescribing mens rea requirements should
be whether heightened mens rea requirements are needed to prevent
morally undeserved punishment. Whenever such punishment is
possible, all mens rea options should be on the table, even knowledge of
the law, unless clearly foreclosed by Congress. Unless and until the
Supreme Court endorses this approach, mens rea selection will continue
to default on its central promise of guaranteeing a path to acquittal for
morally blameless conduct.
I trace the self-defeating limitations of existing mens rea doctrine to
the Supreme Court's simultaneous embrace of two conflicting theories of
the separation of powers in criminal cases. The entire project of reading
judicially created standards of mental culpability into statutes silent, in
whole or in part, as to mens rea necessarily assumes that the Court shares
crime-definition power with Congress: Congress takes the lead in
defining the prohibited act, relegating courts to the familiar posture of
interpretation, but expects courts to take an active role in fleshing out
incompletely specified mens rea requirements in order to keep federal
criminal liability within appropriate bounds. This "cooperative" or
"partnership" model would give the Court wide latitude to impose
whatever standards of mental culpability it deems warranted in
particular settings, provided only that they are not textually foreclosed.
The prevailing mens rea selection methodology, however, rests on a
considerably narrower view of separation of powers: the familiar model
of "faithful-agent textualism." Under this model, the Court must take its
cues from Congress on the mens rea required to convict and thus cannot
impose implied mens rea requirements absent reason to think Congress
would have wanted those requirements. The Court can no longer vacillate
between these inconsistent models of the separation of powers in its
mens rea decisions but must choose among them-and the right choice,
I argue, is the "cooperative" or "partnership" model.
Part IV proposes two sets of reforms that would make mens rea
doctrine truly effective in accomplishing its stated purpose. First, the
Supreme Court should broaden its understanding of "innocence" so that
mens rea doctrine will no longer treat moral blameworthiness as an
"on/off' switch. The doctrine should clearly embrace the widely accepted
principle that punishment must be proportional to blameworthiness.
Heightened mens rea requirements should thus be available to fend off
the possibility of disproportionately severe punishment for blameworthy
acts, no less than punishment for blameless acts. Second, the Court
should expand the remedial options available to courts in responding to
1616 [Vol. 69:1609
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the potential for morally undeserved punishment. In particular, judges
should be very reluctant to infer that essential mens rea requirements are
precluded based on the wording or structure of criminal statutes.
Conversely, judges should not hesitate to require knowledge of the law or
other heightened mens rea standards if failure to do so would permit
punishment that is not morally deserved.
The reforms proposed in this Article would provide the more robust
protection against morally undeserved punishment that current mens
rea doctrine sorely lacks. Ultimately, of course, only robust constitutional
rules can ensure that federal prosecutors will never be able to impose
morally undeserved punishment. Nevertheless, there is much the
Supreme Court can do, through a careful and considered approach to the
interpretation of criminal statutes, to ensure that criminal liability and
punishment will track moral blameworthiness.
I. "INNOCENCE" AND TRADITIONAL MENS REA DOCTRINE
This Part sets the stage for a critical reassessment of federal mens
rea doctrine. The analysis begins with an exploration of the stated
purpose of mens rea requirements and of the prevailing method of mens
rea selection in federal cases. The next issue, deferred until Part II, is the
impact of the recent decision in Elonis v. United States17 on current
doctrine.
A. "INNOCENCE" AND FEDERAL MENS REA REQUIREMENTS
For more than half a century, it has been hornbook law in the federal
system that the goal of mens rea is "innocence"-protection, narrowly
understood as preventing punishment for morally blameless conduct. As
Justice Robert Jackson wrote in Morissette v. United States, the notion
that "an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention ...
is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil."1S The requirement
of a "guilty mind," or mens rea, thus serves "to protect those who were
not blameworthy in mind from conviction" by predicating criminal
liability on the "concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing
hand."19
Although Morissette left no doubt that mens rea requirements are
designed to make moral culpability a prerequisite for punishment, it did
not explain why blameworthiness should be regarded as essential. The
17. 135 S. Ct. 2001(2015).
18. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
19. Id. at 251-52.
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answer, of course, would be obvious to retributivists. For them, the very
purpose of criminal law is to visit the moral stigma of criminal conviction
and the pains of punishment upon those who have transgressed
community standards of morality.20 On this view, mens rea is important
because it separates the morally "guilty" (those who chose "evil" over
"good" and thus deserve punishment) from the morally "innocent" (those
who, in Morissette terms, were not "blameworthy in mind").
These answers would fall flat for utilitarians. In their view, the
purpose of the criminal law is not to enforce community standards of
morality. Rather, it is to avert the social losses of crime through the
familiar mechanisms of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.21
Once the harms the law seeks to prevent have occurred, it is not obvious
why a utilitarian would care whether the offenders made blameworthy
choices. After all, by their unlawful conduct, offenders have revealed
themselves to be dangerous to the interests the law seeks to protect, and
utilitarian theory holds that dangerous persons must be punished to
prevent them and others similarly situated from breaking the law in the
future.
In fact, however, utilitarians do care, perhaps as deeply as
retributivists, about moral blameworthiness. Even though the purpose of
utilitarian punishment is crime prevention, the legitimacy of the criminal
law depends critically on assigning punishment in accordance with moral
desert. As the noted utilitarian Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
famously remarked, to deny that criminal liability is "founded on
blameworthiness ... would shock the moral sense of any civilized
community."22 Precisely because, as Holmes put it, "a law which
punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be too severe for that community to
bear,"23 utilitarians widely accept moral blameworthiness as an
"important limiting principle" on punishment.24 As Professors Paul
Robinson and John Darley have explained:
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91
(1997) ("Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing
because ... offenders deserve it."); H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 1, 9 (1968) (defining retribution
"as the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty .... ).
21. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation, in 1
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 83 (John Bowring ed., 1962) ("[A]ll punishment in itself is evil. Upon
the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it
promises to exclude some greater evil.").
22. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881).
23. Id.
24. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 66-67 (1968); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Purposes ofCriminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and
Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (2003). See generally Paul H. Robinson &
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[T]he criminal law's moral credibility is essential to effective crime control,
and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as
"doing justice," that is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways that
the community perceives as consistent with the community's principles of
appropriate liability and punishment. Conversely, the system's moral
credibility, and therefore its crime control effectiveness, is undermined by
a distribution of liability that deviates from community perceptions of just
desert.2
The view that punishment should track moral blameworthiness has
important implications for the definition of the "innocence" that mens
rea doctrine aims to protect against punishment. Commission of a
blameworthy act is merely the first of two essential culpability-related
inquiries; it is also necessary to ask whether the offender's act was
sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the penalties authorized by
Congress. If the conduct was only minimally blameworthy, to impose
severe penalties would be to visit upon the defendant more punishment
than his or her unlawful act deserves. Simply put, the admittedly hard-
to-quantify differential between the offender's level of blameworthiness
and any higher level of blameworthiness contemplated in the charged
offense is a form of "innocence," no different in principle from a complete
absence of blameworthiness.
Stated differently, the objection to punishment in the absence of
blameworthiness is that such punishment is morally underserved. The
same objection holds true in the case of disproportionately severe
punishment. When a blameworthy act is punished in excess of its
blameworthiness, morally undeserved punishment is imposed even
though some lesser quantum of punishment may have been entirelyjust.
Thus, if, as Morissette holds, punishment for blameless acts should be
precluded by federal mens rea requirements, the same should be true of
punishment in excess of blameworthiness.
Had the Morissette Court not been so single-mindedly focused on
the complete absence of moral blamelessness, it would have seen that, in
many contexts, mens rea requirements serve to rule out
disproportionately severe punishment for blameworthy conduct.
Ironically enough, Morissette was just such a case. If, as seems likely,
Morrisette was at least negligent in assuming that the spent bomb casings
John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers,
Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315
(1984).
25. Robinson & Darley, supra note 24, at 457-58; see also, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law
Theory and Criminal Justice Practice, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 87 (2012) ("There is now widespread
agreement among [utilitarian] scholars that culpability is necessary to justify punishment and should
serve to limit sentences in accord with desert."); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L.
REv. 67, 74-75 (2005) (noting that research indicates that people are more likely to obey the law if
they perceive it as "fair").
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he carted off from an Air Force bombing range had been
abandoned-after all, they were stored on government property, fenced
in from the outside world with "No Trespassing" signs along the
perimeter, and he made no effort to seek permission before taking
them-then he was morally blameworthy. Nevertheless, the high mens
rea required by the Court entitled him to acquittal, despite his
blameworthiness, if he truly believed the casings were abandoned.2 6
This result, inexplicable in terms of preventing punishment without
culpability, makes perfect sense on proportionality grounds. The charges
against Morissette carried serious sanctions, ranging up to ten years in
prison.27 Such heavy penalties suggest they were intended for intentional
wrongdoers who know they are misappropriating government
property.2 8 To visit such harsh sanctions upon persons who honestly
believed they were entitled to take government property would constitute
morally undeserved punishment.
Regrettably, the Supreme Court later seized upon Morissette's
emphasis on preventing punishment for morally blameless conduct to
suggest that implied mens rea requirements cannot validly demand
anything more than minimal culpability. The clearest example is Carter
v. United States, in which the Court declared: "The presumption in favor
of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which
is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent
conduct."'29 Taken literally, that declaration, which is difficult to
reconcile with the holdings of prior cases, 30 leaves no room for
26. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952). To be fair, the Morissette Court's
emphasis on punishment without culpability flowed from the all-or-nothing nature of the defense
before it. The defendant claimed he thought the spent bomb casings he took had been abandoned.
Given that it is not blameworthy to take property that belongs to no one, the Court quite correctly
made knowledge that the property taken belonged to another a necessary element of the crimes of
stealing and knowingly converting government property.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012).
28. The conversion statute explicitly provides that, to be a crime, the conversion of government
property has to be "knowing[]." 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012). This was significant to the outcome in
Morissette. As the Court noted, it was impossible for Morissette to "have knowingly ... converted
property that he did not know could be converted, as would be the case if it was in fact abandoned or
if he truly believed it to be abandoned and unwanted property." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 271.
29. 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72
(1994)).
30. As I have demonstrated in prior work, the Supreme Court often requires more than the
minimal mental culpability necessary to ensure a modicum of moral blameworthiness, but does so
under the guise of excluding morally blameless conduct from the ambit of a criminal statute:
When we look beyond the Court's statements that mens rea serves only to prevent
punishment for blameless conduct, we get a very different picture. What we find is that the
cases support a very different rule-namely, that the current approach often requires
considerably more than minimal culpability. Proportionality, in short, has been smuggled
into the mens rea analysis (partially, at least) through the back door.
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proportionality concerns in mens rea selection even though
disproportionately severe punishment constitutes morally undeserved
punishment.
B. CONTEMPORARY MENS REA DOCTRINE
Contemporary mens rea doctrine emerged from three cases
involving mala prohibita regulatory crimes. These cases are Liparota v.
United States,31 Staples v. United States,32 and Ratzlaf v. United
States.33 In each case, the Court saw a potential for punishment without
culpability and, unwilling to rely on prosecutorial discretion as an
adequate safeguard, responded with heightened mens rea requirements.
The analytical method employed in these watershed cases now
represents the governing approach to mens rea selection in the federal
system.
1. The Foundational Cases: Liparota, Staples, and Ratzlaf
The first case was Liparota. It involved an alleged scheme by the
owner of a store, not authorized to accept food stamps, to purchase food
stamps for less than face value. The owner was prosecuted under a statute
providing criminal penalties for anyone who "uses, transfers, acquires,
alters, or possesses" food stamps "in any manner not authorized by [the
relevant statute] or the [implementing] regulations."34 The issue was
whether the government could convict absent knowledge that the
defendant's use of food stamps was prohibited. Seven Justices agreed
that it could not.
Unless mistake or ignorance of pertinent administrative regulations
were recognized as a defense, the Court feared, a "broad range of
apparently innocent conduct" could be prosecuted as misuse of food
stamps.35 Certain uses of food stamps, though unlawful, would strike
many people as innocuous. As an example, the Court cited a food-stamp
recipient who purchases food from a vendor who, unbeknownst to the
purchaser, charges excessive prices.36 It is illegal to use food stamps on
otherwise permissible purchases at inflated prices, yet the shopper was
merely using food stamps to buy groceries-the very purpose for which
the government supplied food stamps to program recipients. The only
Smith, supra note 11, at 137-38 (discussing Staples and X-Citement Video, Inc.). The issue of "back
door proportionality" is discussed further at infra Part I.B.2.
31. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
32. 511 U.S. 6oo (1994).
33. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
34. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (2012).
35. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426.
36. Id.
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way to prevent conviction in circumstances such as these (and to ensure
that persons convicted of misusing food stamps will be morally
blameworthy) was to require proof that the defendant knowingly violated
the rules governing the use of food stamps.
The next case in the trilogy was Ratzlaf. There, the defendant was
prosecuted for "willfully violating" the "anti-structuring" law. The law
prohibited breaking up into smaller transactions a single cash
transaction worth at least $10,ooo in order to evade a financial
institution's obligation to report to the government large cash
transactions.37 The government claimed that the requisite "willfulness"
was shown by the defendant's purpose to evade the currency transaction
reporting requirement; the defendant countered that willfulness also
demanded proof the defendant knew that "structuring" is illegal. Again,
the Court ruled against the government, making ignorance of the law a
defense.
The Court reasoned that structuring a cash transaction to avoid
triggering currency transaction reporting obligations is not "inevitably
nefarious" in our culture.3 8 In our society, there is nothing wrong with
people choosing to conduct cash transactions in ways designed to avoid
taxes or other unwanted government mandates, or simply to protect their
financial privacy from the prying eyes of government or others.
Accordingly, a conviction for "structuring" required proof the defendant
knew it was illegal to attempt to evade currency transaction reporting
requirements.
The last case, Staples, was a prosecution under the National
Firearms Act for possession of an unregistered "firearm." Among other
major weapons, the term "firearm" includes automatic weapons (guns
capable of firing repeatedly with a single pull of the trigger) but not
semiautomatic weapons. The defendant possessed a semiautomatic rifle
not otherwise subject to federal registration requirements, but the
weapon had somehow acquired the ability to fire automatically,
rendering it a "firearm" that had to be registered.
A prior decision, United States v. Freed,39 had classified the statute
at issue in Staples as a "public welfare offense." This was significant
because Morissette had concluded that the traditional requirement of
moral blameworthiness does not extend to public welfare offenses.40
37. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (2012).
38. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 135 (1994).
39. 401 U.S. 6ol (1971).
40. According to Morissette v. United States, public welfare offenses "heighten the duties of those
in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or
welfare" by requiring them, at their peril, to "comply with reasonable standards of quality, integrity,
disclosure and care." 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952). Given the regulated party's voluntary pursuit of
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Based on Freed, the government argued that the defendant merely had
to know that the item he possessed was a gun. The defendant responded
that the government had to prove knowledge that the weapon had the
particular characteristics which subjected it to federal registration
requirements.
The Court again held that heightened mens rea requirements were
necessary to avoid punishment without culpability. Invoking what it
described as the "tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by
private individuals in this country,"41 the Staples majority concluded
that, without more, there is nothing blameworthy in possessing an item
known to be a gun. In order blameworthiness to exist, the defendant had
to know that the firearm fell into a "quasi-suspect" category and thus did
not constitute the kind of firearm that may be possessed, free of
registration requirements, for legitimate purposes. 42 Thus, absent proof
that Staples actually knew his rifle could fire automatically, he was
entitled to acquittal.
The significance of these cases is difficult to overstate. They
extended Morissette's central concern with ruling out punishment
without culpability to all federal crimes, even public welfare offenses.
This move did not abolish strict liability; Staples, after all, specifically
accepted the holding in Freed that the National Firearms Act was a strict
liability crime.43 It did, however, establish that exercises in formalism,
such as placing particular crimes into "public safety" or other doctrinal
boxes, no longer control mens rea selection. Rather, mens rea questions
must be determined through a common-sense assessment of whether or
not individual elements of a crime are essential to afford would-be
offenders notice that certain activities would be considered wrongful.
Each and every element necessary to the definition of the blameworthy
act requires a "guilty" state of mind, even if (as in Staples) the statute is
silent on the subject.
hazardous activities, courts construe health and safety regulations "mak[ing] no mention of intent as
dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime." Id. at 256. Morissette
cautioned, however, that public welfare offenses are minor crimes, typically misdemeanors punished
by fines only or short jail terms. See id. ("[P]enalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction
does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.").
41. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 6oo, 610 (1994).
42. Id. at 611-12.
43. Id. at 617-18. Strict liability should be distinguished from absolute liability. Crimes of strict
liability require mens rea as a whole, but they dispense with mens rea for part of the offense. Strict
liability, as in the case of public welfare offenses, "tends to apply only when proof of mens rea is
unnecessary to reveal culpability . . . " Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the
Limits of Culpability's Relevance, 75 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 126 (2012). Absolute liability, by
contrast, refers to liability based on acts alone, without regard to the offender's state of mind. The
Model Penal Code reserves absolute liability for noncriminal law offenses called "violations," which
require no mens rea but are punishable onlybyfines. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (AM. LAw INST. 1962).
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2. The Mens Rea Selection Methodology
The decisions in Liparota, Ratzlaf, and Staples followed a common
analytical path which comprises the prevailing method of mens rea
selection in federal cases. 44 The first step is to determine the actus reus
elements and any mens rea requirements included in the legislative
definition of the offense, plus any additional mens rea requirements the
government accepts as essential.45 The Court then looks beyond the facts
of the case, including whether or not the particular defendant's conduct
was blameworthy, and asks, as one leading account explains, "as a
hypothetical matter whether morally blameless people could violate [the
statute]."4 6 If (and, controversially, only if) the answer is "yes," then
heightened mens rea requirements are required: courts must "formulate
an additional ... element about mental state to shield blameless conduct
from criminal condemnation."47
The fairly recent decision in ArthurAndersen LLP v. United States48
nicely illustrates the operation of the mens rea method. The government
charged the consulting firm Arthur Andersen with "corruptly
persuad[ing]" its employees to destroy Enron-related documents with
intent to cause those documents to be unavailable to federal
44. For a detailed explanation of how this analytical method derives from the case law, see Wiley,
supra note 1o, at 1026-57.
45. As stated, the first step goes beyond the actus reus and mens rea requirements specified by
Congress and also takes account of any additional mens rea requirements accepted by the prosecution.
Even when statutes are silent as to mens rea, the government often agrees that certain implied mens
rea requirements apply. In Staples, for example, the National Firearms Act contained no express mens
rea requirements-it simply made it a felony, punishable by up to ten years in prison, to possess
statutory "firearms" that are not duly registered on the federal registry. See 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2012).
Nevertheless, the government agreed that the defendant had to know he was in possession of items
and that those items were weapons (such as a gun in Staples, or hand grenades in Freed). These
additional implied mens rea requirements are taken into account in determining whether heightened
mens rea requirements are required.
46. Wiley, supra note 1o, at 1023. The reference to "morally blameless people" in Wiley's
insightful account is a bit imprecise. Mens rea selection does not call for judges to inquire into the
character of the defendant or other potential offenders, in the manner of a confessor examining a
penitent. The focus, rather, is on conduct: if the conduct prohibited bythe statute is morally blameless,
then there is an innocence-protection problem to be solved by heightened mens rea requirements.
This is so even if, based on other conduct not relevant to the definition of the charged offense, the
defendant before the court could be deemed morally blameworthy.
47. Wiley, supra note 1o, at 1023. Heightened mens rea requirements fall into one of two
categories. The first includes judicially created culpability standards read by implication into statutes
which are entirely or partially silent as to mens rea. See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 (imposing implied
requirement of knowledge of the pertinent facts); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985)
(imposing implied requirement of knowledge of the law). The second includes the construction of
ambiguous statutory mens rea terms. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)
(interpreting statutory requirement of "willfulness").
48. 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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investigators.49 As the method called for, the Court started by identifying
the elements of the crime. These elements were (1) knowingly (2) and
"corruptly" (3) persuading another person (4) to destroy or withhold
evidence (5) with intent to "influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of
any person in an official proceeding."5o
The interpretive issue focused on the meaning of the "corrupt[]"
requirement, as modified by "knowingly." The government claimed it did
not matter whether the alleged "corrupt persuader" lacked bad intent or
even believed it was acting lawfully; all that mattered was that its conduct
impeded a federal investigation through the intentional suppression or
destruction of evidence. The defendant countered that a good-faith belief
in the propriety of destroying or withholding evidence should be a
defense.
The Court then asked, hypothetically, whether the government's
interpretation would allow conviction for morally blameless conduct.
The answer was "yes." Attorneys often advise clients to withhold
documents or testimony from the government on privilege grounds, and
businesses commonly destroy documents that might potentially be of
interest to the government pursuant to corporate document-retention
policies.51 Based on examples such as these, the Court concluded that
"'persuad[ing]' a person 'with intent to... cause' that person to
'withhold' testimony or documents from a Government proceeding or
Government official is not inherently malign."52 Thus presented with a
prosecution theory so broad that the law "covered innocent conduct," the
Court construed the "knowingly ... corrupt[]" requirement to "limit[]
criminality to persuaders conscious of their wrongdoing."53
Notice that the mens rea analysis illustrated in Arthur Andersen is
framed in terms that seemingly preclude consideration of proportionality
concerns. On its face, the mens rea analysis only aspires to "shield
blameless conduct from criminal condemnation."54 The implication,
previously endorsed in Carter v. United States,55 is that heightened mens
49. Id. at 702 (describing indictment). "Corrupt persuasion" is a form of obstruction of justice
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Arthur Andersen was charged pursuant to section 1512(b)(2), which
subjects to conviction anyone who "knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades
another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with
intent to-... (2) cause or induce any person to--(A) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any
person in an official proceeding; [or] (B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to
impair the object's integrity or availabilityfor use in an official proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A)-
(B) (2012).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (2012).
51. Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-o6.
52. Id. at 703-04.
53. Id. at 706.
54. Wiley, supra note to, at 1023 (emphasis added).
55. 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000).
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rea requirements cannot be employed to prevent disproportionately
severe punishment for blameworthy acts. As one scholar has concluded,
the mens rea method only allows courts to require a "minimally
sufficient element about mental state to shield blameless conduct from
criminal condemnation,"5 6 a limitation he describes as a "rule against
requiring superfluous culpability."57
These claims are understandable but mistaken. It is true, so far as it
goes, that the analysis only seeks to determine whether or not there is a
danger of punishment for blameless conduct. It thus, as conventionally
framed, provides no affirmative support for imposing more demanding
mens rea requirements where there is no risk of punishment without
culpability.5 8 This hardly means, however, that proportionality concerns
play no role in mens rea selection. To the contrary, proportionality
concerns enter the analysis through what I have described in prior work
as the "back door"-that is, in responding to potential punishment for
blameless conduct.59
If "minimally sufficient" culpability were all that mens rea doctrine
requires, then negligence or recklessness would be the default mens rea
in federal cases. After all, those are the lowest levels of culpability that
are widely accepted as justifying criminal sanctions. 60 Nevertheless, in
Liparota, Ratzlaf, and Staples, the Supreme Court required a
substantially more culpable mental state (knowledge) when it detected a
risk that blameless conduct might lead to conviction. These cases show
that, in federal cases, the mens rea requirement often demands high, not
"minimal," levels of culpability.
Take Staples v. United States first. The Court there ruled that it is
not a crime to possess an unregistered "machinegun" unless the
defendant actually knew the weapon could fire automatically.61 The two
56. Wiley, supra note lo, at 1023 (emphasis added).
57. Wiley, supra note lo, at 1128.
58. This, I shall argue, changed in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). See infra Part
II.
59. See Smith, supra note 11, at 137-44.
60. See Smith, supra note 11, at 137; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (AM. LAW INST.
1962) (recognizing recklessness and negligence as culpable mental states). The Code defines
"negligence" as involving unawareness of risks that are so substantial and unjustifiable that the actor's
failure to perceive them amounts to a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person" would have observed under the circumstances. Id. § 2.02(2)(d). Recklessness, by contrast,
involves "conscious[] disregard[]" of risks that are so substantial and unjustifiable as to constitute a
"gross deviation from the standard of conduct" that a "law-abiding person" would have observed in
such circumstances. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). Although negligence is thus regarded as a culpable mental state,
the Code drafters chose the higher standard of recklessness as the default mens rea required for Code
offenses. Id. § 2.02(3). The Code also recognizes two higher standards of culpability; they are, in
ascending order, "knowledge" and "purpose." Id. § 2.02(2)(a)-(b).
61. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 6oo, 619 (1994).
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other cases in the foundational trilogy, Liparota and Ratzlaf, adopted
even more stringent mens rea requirements. These cases did not simply
require knowledge of the facts bearing on the legality of the charged
conduct, as Staples did; they required proof that the defendants actually
knew the law. Brushing aside the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no
excuse," Liparota v. United States ruled that defendants cannot be
convicted of misusing food stamps unless they knew that they were
violating applicable food stamp regulations.62 Similarly, the Ratzlaf v.
United States Court ruled that the crime of "structuring" requires proof
that the defendant knew it is illegal to break up a cash transaction
involving at least $10,ooo for the purpose of avoiding federal currency
transaction reporting requirements. 63
In each case, if it intended merely to guarantee some minimal level
of moral culpability, the Supreme Court would have ruled that the
defendants could be convicted if they acted unreasonably. This would
have meant that Staples was guilty if he should have known of his gun's
automatic-firing capability and that Liparota and Ratzlaf were guilty if
they should have known their conduct was illegal. Instead, in each case,
the Court imposed the considerably more demanding requirement of
actual knowledge. 64
To summarize, in cases like Liparota, Staples, and Ratzlaf, the
Supreme Court is saying one thing, but doing something quite different.
On the one hand, the Court speaks as if the propriety of heightened mens
rea requirements turns solely on whether or not the statute would
otherwise allow punishment without culpability. On the other hand,
when the Court perceives such a risk, it does not simply ratchet up mens
rea requirements to a level sufficient to ensure some minimal level of
culpability on the part of offenders. Instead, it raises the required mens
rea to a level that is sufficient to ensure that the prohibited acts are
sufficiently culpable to deserve the penalties authorized by Congress.
62. 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
63. 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994).
64. The same dynamic played out in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994),
a prosecution for knowing possession and distribution of child pornography. A minimal-culpability
standard would have allowed conviction as long as the defendant should have known that the materials
in question were pornographic in nature and featured minors. After all, possessing material that any
reasonable person would know to be child pornography can hardly be considered "innocent." Accord
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-69 (1982) (discussing the serious harms flowing from child
pornography). Nevertheless, the Court required actual knowledge that the depiction features minors
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. See X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 78 ("[W]e conclude that
the term 'knowingly' in § 2252 extends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the
age of the performers.").
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II. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE "GUILTY MIND" REQUIREMENT:
ELONIS V. UNITED STATES
This Part addresses the recent decision in Elonis v. United States,65
the case involving a prosecution for violent "rap" lyrics posted on
Facebook. After summarizing the facts of the case, I turn to a discussion
of Elonis's impact on mens rea doctrine. As will become clear, the
decision took a major first step toward elevating proportionality of
punishment into an independent goal of mens rea doctrine, separate and
apart from avoiding punishment without culpability. If the Court follows
through on this fundamental reconception of the meaning of
"innocence"-and it should-Elonis could represent the single most
important federal mens rea decision since Morissette.
Next, I discuss two self-defeating elements in the Elonis Court's
analytical approach. First, although the Court properly took
proportionality concerns into account, it did not follow them to their
logical conclusion. Whereas prior decisions imposing heightened mens
rea requirements demanded proof of knowledge, a high level of mens rea,
in order to fend off punishment without blameworthiness (decisions I
have described as exercises in "back door" proportionality), 66 Elonis left
the door open to recklessness as a sufficiently culpable mental state in
threats prosecutions. This suggests that the "front door" allowing
proportionality concerns to enter into mens rea selection may not be as
wide as the "back door." Second, the Court gave needless breadth to the
threats statute. The term "threat" could, and should, have been narrowly
interpreted as covering only communications intended to be understood
as menacing, yet the Court broadly construed the term to include any
statement that might cause listeners to fear bodily harm. In this sense,
the potential for morally undeserved-perhaps even
unconstitutional-punishment in threat prosecutions represents a self-
inflicted wound caused by the Court's puzzling penchant for construing
federal criminal statutes broadly.
A. THE ALLEGED "THREATS" IN ELONIS
Anthony Douglas Elonis, who used online rap-style names such as
"Tone Dougie" and "Tone Elonis," began listening to violent rap music
and posting his own equally violent lyrics on Facebook after his wife left
him and he was fired from his job. According to disclaimers he posted
online, the posts he made concerning his ex-wife and various other
persons were "fictitious" only, with no "resemblance to real persons." 67
65. 135 S. Ct. 2001(2015).
66. See Smith, supra note 11, at 137-44.
67. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
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Much like his idol, the controversial rapper known as Eminem, his
intended purpose was to work through difficult life experiences: "I'm
doing this for me. My writing is therapeutic." He added: "Art is about
pushing limits. I'm willing to go to jail for my Constitutional rights. Are
you?"68
Despite these disclaimers, the posts understandably inspired fear
among those who came across them. Although the posts were not
communicated to anyone, having merely been posted on Elonis's
personal Facebook page, his former supervisor discovered the posts
because he was a "friend" of Elonis's on Facebook. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation opened an investigation and begin monitoring Elonis's
online activity.
The following are representative of the various online statements
underlying the charges. In one post, based on a well-known sketch
comedy routine about threats against the President of the United States
called "It's Illegal to Say.. .," Elonis wrote "Did you know that it's illegal
for me to say I want to kill my wife? . . . [W]hat's interesting is that it's
very illegal to say I really, really think someone out there should kill my
wife." 69 Evidently angered that his wife had obtained an order of
protection against him, he wrote: "Fold up your [protective order] and
put it in your pocket. Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? ... [I]f worse
comes to worse I've got enough explosives to take care of the State Police
and the Sheriffs Department."70
Later adding that "hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a
Kindergarten class,"71 he took rhetorical aim at the FBI agent who
interviewed him about his online posts. He wrote: "Little Agent lady
stood so close[.] Took all the strength I had not to turn the b*tch
ghost .... So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant[.]
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives expert ... Cause little did y'all
know, I was strapped wit' a bomb[.] Why do you think it took me so long
to get dressed with no shoes on?"72
Although he described himself as 'just an aspiring rapper who likes
the attention,"73 the attention he received came neither from recording
studios nor adoring fans. He was arrested and indicted for having made
threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), a felony
punishable by up to five years in prison. The statute makes it a crime to
"transmit[] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
68. Id. at 2005-o6.
69. Id. at 2005.
70. Id. at 2oo6.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2007.
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containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the
person of another."74
Dismissing claims that Elonis never intended to harm or intimidate
anyone, the District Judge ruled that the crime was proven if Elonis's
statements would have caused a reasonable person to fear bodily injury.
The jury deemed the standard met on all but one count and returned a
guilty verdict. Elonis was sentenced to forty-four months in prison,
followed by three years of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed,
adding that the statute, so construed, did not violate the First
Amendment.75
B. THE PURPOSE OF FEDERAL MENS REA REQUIREMENTS, REVISITED
Without a doubt, Elonis's conduct was morally blameworthy.
Although he may not have intended to harm or intimidate his ex-wife or
anyone else, his violent online posts could easily inspire fear in a
reasonable person. He singled out his wife, by name, while they were
engaged in an acrimonious separation and divorce-raising obvious
concerns of potential domestic violence. Furthermore, he discussed
using explosives against law enforcement officials and innocent
schoolchildren. The fact that these violent ruminations took the form of
rap-style lyrics posted online, instead of more conventional forms of
intimidation transmitted directly to victims, does not detract from their
potential to cause fear. He might or might not have been within his
"[c]onstitutional rights," as he claimed, in making his statements,76 but
he certainly had fair warning that it is wrongful to make menacing
statements causing innocent third parties to fear a violent attack.
For those who believe that mens rea doctrine merely rules out
punishment without culpability, Elonis was an easy case for affirmance.
This view comes through, loud and clear, in Justice Clarence Thomas's
separate opinion in Elonis. Thomas argued Elonis's negligence in the
words he used was a "guilty" enough mental state to warrant conviction.
As he put it:
A defendant like Elonis . . ., who admits that he "knew that what [he] was
saying was violent" but supposedly "just wanted to express [him]self,"
acted with the general intent required under § 875(c), even if he did not
74. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
75. Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
76. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006. For especially thoughtful arguments that menacing speech is
constitutionally protected absent proof of subjective intent to intimidate, see Leslie Kendrick, Free
Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1255 (2014); G. Robert Blakey & Brian Murray, Threats,
Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REv. 829.
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know that a jury would conclude that his communication constituted a
"threat" as matter of law.77
The lynchpin of Thomas's analysis was his prior majority opinion in
Carter v. United States,78 which he read to make "general intent" only
the default culpability standard in federal cases.79
Importantly, Thomas stood alone on the sufficiency of negligence as
a sufficiently blameworthy mental state. The seven-Justice majority,
joined by Justice Samuel Alito in partial concurrence, specifically
rejected negligence (which it construed Thomas and the government as
advocating)o as a legally insufficient basis for conviction under the
threats statute. To the Court, negligence simply was not blameworthy
enough to warrant punishment.
The Court's analysis on this point was, functionally speaking, a
proportionality analysis. The Court made no claim that Elonis's conduct
was morally blameless. The problem was essentially that the
government's approach would punish in excess of blameworthiness, an
issue of disproportionately severe punishment. As the majority
explained:
Elonis's conviction ... was premised solely on how his posts would be
understood by a reasonable person. Such a "reasonable person" standard
is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent with "the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing." Having liability turn on whether a "reasonable person"
regards the communication as a threat-regardless of what the defendant
thinks-"reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to
negligence," and we "have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence
standard was intended in criminal statutes." Under these principles, "what
[Elonis] thinks" does matter.S1
77. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
79. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Carter, 530 U.S. at 268)
("[A]bsent such [showing], we ordinarily apply the 'presumption in favor of scienter' to require only
'proof of general intent. .. ."). Although the distinction is complicated by inconsistent usage, crimes
of "general intent" are best understood as satisfied by proof of negligence or recklessness, whereas
"specific intent" crimes require proof that the accused acted purposely or knowingly. LAFAVE, supra
note 6, § 5.2(e), at 353-55. For a thoughtful exploration of the differences between general and specific
intent, see Eric A. Johnson, Understanding General and Specific Intent: Eight Things I Know for
Sure, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 521 (2016).
8o. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011; see also id. ("Elonis can be convicted, the Government contends, if
he himself knew the contents and context of his posts, and a reasonable person would have recognized
that the posts would be read as genuine threats. That is a negligence standard."); id. at 2015 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that "we should presume that an offense like that
created by § 875(c) requires more than negligence with respect to a critical element like the one at
issue here.").
81. Id. at 2011 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas objected that, under general intent, "the
defendant must know--not merely be reckless or negligent with respect to the fact that he is
committing the acts that constitute the actus reus of the offense." Id. at 2022 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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This is not "back door" proportionality. Rather, it is, at long last,
proportionality through the "front door," in which preventing
punishment in excess of moral blameworthiness is itself a legitimate goal
of mens rea doctrine. Even though the government's preferred
negligence standard would have prevented punishment without
culpability, it would have ensnared people whose only crime was
essentially speaking carelessly. People who neither intended to do harm
nor cause others to fear bodily harm, but imprudently used words that a
reasonable person might view as threatening, could be convicted and
imprisoned for up to five years.82 Even if such persons deserve some
appropriate level of punishment, mens rea doctrine, as utilized in Elonis,
helps ensure that punishment in excess of culpability will not be imposed.
This is as it should be. Criminal law theorists have emphasized
proportionality as an important precondition for the just imposition of
punishment. As Professor Richard Burgh has explained:
[I]n order to render punishment compatible with justice, it is not enough
that we restrict punishment to the deserving, but we must, in addition,
restrict the degree of punishment to the degree that is deserved. The idea
is that, in committing an offense, we do not think of the offender as
deserving unlimited punishment; rather we think of him as deserving a
degree of punishment that is proportional to the gravity of the offense he
committed .... Justice, in other words, not only requires a principle of
desert, but also requires a principle of proportionality between the gravity
of the offense and the punishment deserved. 83
The emphasis on proportionality of punishment flows naturally
from retributive theories of punishment but, importantly, is also
embraced by utilitarians. In fact, "[t]he most sustained and detailed
This claim is incorrect. Under the general intent standard, even if the defendant did not know an actus
reus element existed, he or she is still guilty if a reasonable person would have known. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 12.03-12.05 (2d ed. 1995). As Elonis correctly
concluded, to punish a defendant for not knowing facts that would have been apparent to a reasonable
person is the very definition of a negligence standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAw
INST. 1962) (stating that a person acts negligently "when he [or she] should be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk" and "the actor's failure to perceive [the risk] ... involves a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.").
82. The same basic objection applies to a recklessness standard for threats prosecutions (which
Elonis left open as a sufficient basis for conviction). A recklessness standard would go beyond
negligence and require the defendant to have been aware of the risk that his or her words might be
understood as threatening bodily harm. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness as
"conscious[] disregard[]" of pertinent risks). Even so, as a standard for determining when speech can
be punished as a threat, recklessness resembles negligence in that both involve unintentionally placing
others in fear through poor judgment about the proper manner in which to express oneself. Perhaps
for this reason, the Third Circuit on remand reaffirmed Elonis's conviction, not on recklessness
grounds, but on the dubious ground that a properly instructed jury would have found that Elonis knew
his statements would inspire fear. See United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 599 (3d Cir. 2016)
("Reviewing the whole record, we find that even if Elonis had contested the knowledge element in his
testimony, no rational juror would have believed him."), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 67 (2018).
83. Richard Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 197-98 (1982).
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arguments for proportional punishments come not from retributive
theorists, but from their philosophical adversaries: advocates of
utilitarian theories of punishment."84 H.L.A. Hart, for example,
contended that the "guiding principle" in grading offenses should be
"proportion," by which he meant a "commonsense scale of gravity" based
on "very broad judgments both of relative moral iniquity and
harmfulness of different types of offence."8 5 It is thus wrong to suggest,
as Justice Antonin Scalia once did, that "[p]roportionality-the notion
that the punishment should fit the crime-is inherently a concept tied to
the penological goal of retribution."8 6
Consistent with the consensus view of criminal law theorists,
criminal law tradition squarely supports proportionality of punishment
as a goal of the mens rea requirement. In his famous lectures on the
common law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. gave the example of the crime
of larceny, in which intent to steal is required. The "intent to steal"
requirement does guarantee culpability among potential offenders-for
example, by affording a defense to persons who, as the defendant claimed
in Morissette v. United States,8 7 mistakenly believed they were entitled
to take the property. Importantly, however, it also serves a vital
proportionality function by reserving the strict penalties the crime of
larceny authorizes for the most blameworthy takings of property: those
intended to be permanent. As Holmes explained:
A momentary loss of possession [of property] is not what has been
guarded against with such severe penalties. What the law means to prevent
is the loss of [property taken] wholly and forever, as is shown by the fact
that it is not larceny to take for a temporary use without intending to
deprive the owner of his property.88
84. Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle ofLimited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 272
(2005) (discussing the prominence of proportionality principles in the utilitarian theories of Jeremy
Bentham and Cesare Beccaria).
85. H.L.A. HART, Reform and the Individualization of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 25 (1968). Deviation from proportionality-based
limits on punishment, Hart recognized, would "risk ... either confusing common morality or flouting
it and bringing the law into contempt." Id; see also, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 24, at 477-
78 ("Enhancing the criminal law's moral credibility requires, more than anything, that the criminal
law ... earn a reputation for (1) punishing those who deserve it under rules perceived as just, (2)
protecting from punishment those who do not deserve it, and (3) where punishment is deserved,
imposing the amount of punishment deserved, no more, no less ... even if a non-desert distribution
appears in the short-run to offer the possibility of reducing crime.").
86. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). For an
extensive discussion of proportionality-based limits on punishment in utilitarian theory (and a
refutation of Scalia's position in Ewing), see generally Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia:
Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REv. 321 (2010).
87. 342 U.S. 246, 248-49 (1952).
88. HOLMES, supra note 22, at 71.
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A more dramatic example comes from the law of homicide.
Originally, the mandatory penalty for murder was execution, and English
judges, self-consciously motivated by proportionality concerns,
responded by creating the lesser crime of manslaughter.8 9 Mens rea, in
the form of the vague but critically important concept of "malice
aforethought," became the definitional mechanism through which the
law sought to exempt less culpable killings from the death penalty: only
killings committed with malice aforethought constitute murder. Killings
committed without malice aforethought often are morally blameworthy,
as the existence of manslaughter and other lesser homicide crimes (such
as negligent or vehicular homicide) readily affirms. Nevertheless, malice
aforethought is treated as a necessary element for murder-and properly
so. The stiff penalties murder statutes afford, ranging up to the ultimate
sanction (the death penalty) and life imprisonment, require very serious
culpability. Mens rea is the means by which the law differentiates the
killings deserving of the penalties for murder from those meriting only
the punishments for less serious forms of homicide.9o
Even within the separate categories of murder and manslaughter,
mens rea is used to differentiate between different grades of the
respective offenses. For example, apart from the felony-murder rule,
intent to kill is required to convict of murder in the first degree, and
unintentional killings (such as killings committed knowingly or through
extreme recklessness) are classified as second-degree murder.91
Similarly, the penalty for taking human life, in the absence of the malice
required for murder, depends on mens rea: the highest category of
manslaughter (voluntary manslaughter) is reserved for intentional
killings, and unintentional (reckless or negligent) killings fall within the
lower category of involuntary manslaughter.92 In all of these cases, mens
rea serves to achieve proportional punishments by matching up the
culpability of killings with the appropriate ranges of punishment.
89. See ROY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 9-12, 60 (1952) (examining the roots of the
different levels of culpability for homicide).
90. In the federal system, murder is potentially punishable by death or life imprisonment, but the
maximum penalty for manslaughter killing without malice aforethought is ten years in prison.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012) (murder), with id. § 1112(b) (2012) (manslaughter).
91. Id. § 1111(a). As the Supreme Court has recognized, watering down the mens rea requirements
for first-degree murder would upset Congress's careful attempt to grade murders into the appropriate
categories of punishment. See Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 172-73 (1998) (ruling that the
federal murder statute limiting first-degree murder to intentional killings precludes prosecutors from
using the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), to borrow state first-degree murder statutes with
lesser mens rea requirements).
92. Id. § 1112(a).
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A more contemporary example comes from aggravated assault
statutes. Assault, in any form, is morally blameworthy,93 yet modern
legislatures often peg the level of offense and punishment for particular
types of assaults to mens rea. Basic assault is a crime, often punished as
a misdemeanor, but the penalties for assault increase based on mens rea:
intent to inflict serious bodily harm, rape, or kill results in felony
convictions and progressively more severe penalties.94 In cases such as
these, no less than in Holmes's example of larceny or crimes of homicide,
mens rea serves the goal of achieving proportional punishment.95
Seen in this light, mens rea requirements often do more than require
moral culpability on the part of the defendant. Instead, they require proof
of a sufficiently culpable mental state, judged in light of the seriousness
of penalties available for the crime or crimes charged. This broader,
considerably more robust requirement brings into the mens rea analysis
the traditional requirement that, to bejust, criminal punishment must be
proportional to (or "fit") the defendant's crime.
In rejecting negligence, then, the Elonis Court, without being as
clear as it might have, considerably broadened the purpose of federal
mens rea requirements. Those requirements should no longer be
understood as merely ruling out punishment for morally blameless
conduct, as the Court has incorrectly suggested on occasion. Rather, the
requirements rule out morally unjustified punishment-including
excessive punishment for blameworthy acts. Proper mens rea analysis,
duly informed by proportionality concerns, thus provides an important
legal safeguard against unjust conviction in federal prosecutions.96
93. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975) (treating the "federal officer"
element in the federal assault statute as a strict liability element because assault is itself "wrongful"
regardless of its intended target).
94. See generally 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 198 (15th ed. 1994) (explaining that assault or
battery "will constitute a higher degree of the offense if the defendant acted intentionally; it is less
aggravated or of a lesser degree if he acted recklessly; and it is the least serious or of the least degree
if he acted negligently.").
95. The very statute at issue in Elonis provides a further example. It prohibits a variety of different
threats, using mens rea to match particular threats to the levels of punishment Congress deemed
appropriate. Threats of bodily harm made with intent to extort or, in the case of kidnapping, to obtain
ransom are punishable by a maximum of twentyyears in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 875(a)-(b). In the absence
of such intent, however, the same kinds of threats are subject to a much lower five-year maximum. See
id. § 875(c).
96. Apart from legal safeguards against morally undeserved punishment, there is prosecutorial
discretion as a potential failsafe. If prosecutors could be trusted to charge only blameworthy offenders
and to seek only proportional penalties in the event of conviction, then legal safeguards against morally
undeserved punishment might be unnecessary. The Supreme Court's emphasis on using implied mens
rea requirements to prevent punishment without culpability necessarily (and, in my view, rightly)
reflects reluctance to leave that vital work to prosecutorial whim. See Wiley, supra note lo, at 1o58-
68. Even so, there is considerably less justification for relying on prosecutorial discretion to prevent
excessive punishment. As I have explained in prior work, "federal prosecutors are categorically barred
from taking proportionality into account in pending cases and must, from start to finish, pursue the
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C. A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AT WAR WITH
ITSELF
As radical as Elonis potentially is concerning the relevance of
proportionality concerns to mens rea selection, the decision is otherwise
quite typical of the Supreme Court's approach to the interpretation of
federal criminal laws. Although Elonis lifted the blinders to
proportionality considerations in mens rea selection, it kept them firmly
in place when construing the actus reus elements of the crime of the
threats statute. These elements are: (1) the defendant transmitted a
communication; (2) the communication was in interstate or foreign
commerce; and (3) the communication "contain[ed]" a "threat to injure
the person of another."97 The Court treated the statute as completely
silent as to mens rea and devoted itself to the task of determining whether
(and, if so, what) implied mens rea requirements should be read into the
law.
The Court was understandably troubled by the possibility that
unintentionally threatening speech could be punished as a felony, but
failed to recognize its own role in facilitating that unsettling outcome.
Under the guise of adhering to dictionary meaning, the Court breezily
construed the term "threat" so broadly as to encompass any statement
that might be viewed as indicative of an intention to injure another. In
the majority's view, all that matters is that the communication could
signify an intention to injure, not a genuine intention within the mind of
the speaker.98
This interpretation is hardly compelled. Indeed, a decent case can
be made for the opposite reading based on the same dictionary
definitions cited in Elonis. As one judge explained in a prior threats case:
"Every relevant definition of the noun 'threat' or the verb 'threaten,'
whether in existence when Congress passed the law (1932) or today,
includes an intent component."99 On this view, there is a critical
difference between menacing and threatening communications.
Menacing communications are statements that reasonably tend to
inspire fear, whereas threatening communications are intended to cause
highest supportable sentence under the guidelines given the law and facts of particular cases." Smith,
supra note 11, at 154. There is thus real value added in using mens rea to prevent disproportionate
punishment.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 875(a)-(b) (2012).
98. Dictionary definitions of "threat," the Court thought, "speak to what the statement
conveys-not to the mental state of the author. For example, an anonymous letter that says 'I'm going
to kill you' is 'an expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm' regardless of the author's intent."
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008 (2015) (citations omitted).
99. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dubitante).
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fear by informing the victim that the speaker plans to do him or her
bodily harm.
Indeed, the Court missed the fact that the government should have
lost even on the broad interpretation of "threat." If, as Elonis held, a
"threat" "is 'an expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm,"'oo the
defendant's admittedly violent posts did not qualify as such. After all, the
posts did not state or otherwise express any intention to harm anyone, as
in the Court's example of "an anonymous letter that says 'I'm going to kill
you."'101 Unlike the Court's example, Elonis's supposed intention to inflict
harm was inferred from his statements, which is significant because the
threats statute specifically requires that the communication itself
"contain[]" the threat.102 The threats in question were not "contained" in
Elonis's writings but rather were inferred from them. Properly read,
therefore, the threats statute determines liability solely on the basis of
what the communications actually say, as opposed to what listeners read
into them by way of inference.103
This narrow reading, unlike the Court's, fits with the threats statute
as a whole. The other kinds of threats prohibited by section 875 are made
for particular purposes, such as to extort money or property, or, in the
case of kidnapping, to obtain ransom. 10 4 Those other threats are intended
to place the victim in fear because fear is what will cause the victim to
acquiesce in the perpetrator's unlawful demands. Reading threats to
kidnap or injure pursuant to section 875(c) similarly to require intent to
inspire fear thus fits with the overall statutory scheme's concern with
prohibiting communications designed to intimidate others by causing
them to fear violence or other unlawful reprisals.
To the extent the term "threat" is not free of ambiguity, however, the
prudent course in Elonis was to construe it narrowly to require proof that
the speaker intended to inspire a fearful reaction. The narrow
loo. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008 (2015).
to1. Id.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
103. There is a close analogy in the law of perjury. Under Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352,
361-62 (1973), which flatly rejected the notion of "perjury by implication," the perjurious nature of a
sworn statement is determined on the truth or falsity of the statement itself, without reference to the
inferences one might draw from it. See id. at 357-58 (holding that the perjury statute "does not make
it a criminal act for a witness to... state any material matter that implies any material matter that he
does not believe to be true"). Thus, no matter how misleading a sworn statement is, it is not perjury if
it is literally true-and that is so even if the witness's intent was to mislead the factfinder.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(a) (proscribing "demand[s] or request[s] for a ransom or reward for the
release of any kidnapped person"); § 875(c) (proscribing threats to kidnap); § 875(d) (proscribing
threats made "with intent to extort ... money or other thing of value").
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construction would have ensured the statute's constitutionalityo5 and
restricted the law to the most blameworthy of threats (those designed to
place others in fear by communicating the speaker's intent to inflict
bodily harm). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court engaged in what might
be called statutory interpretation at war with itself. The Court
expansively construed the actus reus, which raised serious problems of
unjust (and possibly unconstitutional) applications. Having done so, the
Court then sought to narrow the statute, as judicially enlarged, by
creating implied mens rea requirements to fend off at least some of the
troubling applications the Court itself had made possible.
Though regrettable, this approach to the interpretation of federal
criminal statutes is hardly unique to Elonis. Rather, the Supreme Court
routinely ignores proportionality and other pertinent concerns in its rush
to expand the reach of federal criminal laws in cases involving
blameworthy offenders. To that extent, the Court shares with Congress
the blame for the federalization of crime and rampant overpunishment
in the federal system. As I have explained elsewhere:
Far from being innocent bystanders in the federalization of crime, federal
judges have been all too willing to construe federal crimes expansively,
without regard to the often dramatic effects expansive interpretations will
have on the punishment federal defendants face. The root of the problem
is that the courts view themselves as having an obligation to ensure that no
morally blameworthy defendant ever slips through the federal cracks. In
focusing on the culpability of the conduct for which prosecutors seek to
convict, courts lose sight of the disproportionality of the penalties to which
their expansive interpretations often expose federal defendants. The
inevitable result of how courts approach their interpretive tasks is a
broader and more punitive federal code.1o 6
III. METHODOLOGICAL FLAws IN FEDERAL MENS REA DOCTRINE
As previously explained, Elonis helped close a major gap in mens rea
doctrine by, for the first time, taking proportionality concerns into
account in deciding whether to impose heightened mens rea
requirements. In this Part, the focus is on how well mens rea doctrine
accomplishes its stated goal of preventing punishment for morally
blameless conduct, as opposed to disproportionately severe punishment.
At first blush, the approach seems almost sublime in its pursuit of the
objective of guaranteeing culpability: the Court asks whether a federal
statute would permit conviction for morally blameless conduct absent
more demanding mens rea requirements, and imposes such
105. After all, for reasons explored by Professor Leslie Kendrick, there can be no social value in
statements actually intended to put others in fear of bodily injury instead of to communicate an idea.
Kendrick, supra note 76, at 1286-90.
106. Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91VA. L. REv. 879, 884 (2005).
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requirements where necessary to prevent that possibility from
materializing. On closer inspection, however, the doctrine does not work
nearly so well.
Two areas have proven particularly problematic for the doctrine to
handle. One concerns ignorance of law defenses. These defenses are
especially potent tools for limiting the potential for punishment without
fault, yet the new method only allows such defenses in exceedingly
narrow circumstances. Another area of difficulty concerns the potential
for express mens rea requirements in different criminal laws, or the
wording or structure of the same law, to be read as impliedly precluding
courts from adopting heightened mens rea requirements essential to
exempt blameless conduct from punishment. These limitations, I argue,
are the result of confusion concerning separation of powers. Unless the
Court makes the right choice among the competing visions of the
separation of powers, mens rea selection will continue to be ineffective in
fully accomplishing its stated objectives.
A. "IGNORANTIA JuRIs NEMINEM ExcusAT"
The most significant shortcoming in the new approach to mens rea
is that it does not satisfactorily answer the following question: what if a
law prohibits conduct that ordinary, adequately socialized citizens have
no reason to believe is either morally wrong or unlawful? In this
situation, the usual approach of requiring high levels of mens rea as to
the facts that comprise the offense will afford no protection to the well-
intentioned citizen, precisely because the conduct is so innocuous. Where
citizens are not socialized to expect that prohibited conduct is subject to
legal regulation, criminal law operates as a trap for the unwary.
To illustrate the problem, consider the following example. Suppose
that, to avoid compromising ongoing American military operations,
Congress makes it a crime for persons within the United States to
communicate with nationals of countries in which American military
forces are engaged in combat operations. An Afghan student, enrolled at
an American university, calls home to make sure no one was injured in
the armed conflict. The telecommunications provider alerts federal
authorities, and the student is arrested. The question to be considered is
this: assuming prosecutors are unwilling to decline prosecution, is there
a guaranteed path for acquittal for the student?
Unfortunately, the student's fate would seem to depend entirely on
whether or not heightened mens rea requirements apply. The actus reus
of the crime is plainly satisfied. To speak by telephone with someone is
to "communicate" with them and, just as plainly, the student placed the
call from within the United States to nationals of a country in which
American forces were engaged in military operations. There also appear
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to be no applicable defenses.1o7 Finally, the prospects for a successful
constitutional challenge appear to be slim at best. The statute does not
infringe on constitutionally protected activity and, though overbroad in
light of its stated purpose, almost certainly has a rational basis.1os The
strongest basis for a constitutional challenge would seem to be Lambert
v. California,109 which is perhaps the best indication of how dire the
student's situation really is.
If this is right, then the student's only potential "out" is mens rea.
Here, too, the student appears to be out of luck. As the Court noted in
Staples v. United States, "a conventional mens rea element ... would
require that the defendant know the facts that make his [or her] conduct
illegal."11o This would solve some potential problems of punishment
without culpability, such as the possibility of charges for calls made by
persons who were unaware that American forces were conducting
operations in the countries they called. It would do nothing, however, to
help the student. Quite simply, the student knows all the facts made
relevant by the definition of the offense-namely, that he or she placed
an international call to foreign nationals in a location where U.S. forces
were engaged in combat operations.
The difficulty in the student's case is more fundamental. Making an
international telephone call for legitimate purposes is morally neutral
conduct that no one would expect to be a crime, even if American forces
happen to be deployed in the region called. Traditional mens rea
requirements cannot protect the student against conviction because the
legislatively prescribed elements of the crime do not define an act that
ordinary citizens would expect to be considered wrongful.
This is not to say that mens rea cannot solve the hypothetical
innocence-protection problem. To the contrary, there is a ready solution
107. The best possible defense would be necessity. The defense of necessity exempts from
punishment individuals who committed a crime as an essential means of preventing a greater harm
from occurring. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 81, at § 22.01. Although the student could argue that
placing the illegal call was justified in order to avoid harm to his family, the defense would almost
certainly fail. To be justified, the harm avoided by the commission of the crime must be "'clear and
imminent."' DRESSLER, supra note 81, at § 22.02. In the hypothetical, it is not even clear that the
student's family was in any danger, much less an imminent danger requiring immediate action on the
part of the student. Moreover, the necessity defense does not apply where there are lawful alternative
means of averting the greater harm. DRESSLER, supra note 81, at § 22.02. As recent events in troubled
hot spots around the globe illustrate, the Red Cross and other international organizations can be
utilized to ascertain the fate of loved ones in regions of conflict, not to mention foreign embassies and
consulates. For these reasons, the defense of necessitywouldbe unlikelyto succeed in the hypothetical.
1o8. Rational-basis scrutiny is notoriously undemanding. All it requires is that the challenged law
bear a "rational relation" to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 491(1955).
109. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
110. 511 U.S. 6oo, 605 (1994).
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to situations in which the prohibited conduct is neither intrinsically
immoral nor illegal. That solution is to require proof that the defendant
knew that his or her conduct was illegal. Unfortunately, current mens rea
doctrine would not allow courts to recognize ignorance of the law as a
defense.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has made inroads on ignorantiajuris
neminem excusat, the dogma that ignorance of the law is never an
excuse. In Ratzlaf v. United States, for instance, the Court ruled that
breaking up of a cash transaction worth $10,ooo or more into smaller
increments to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements is not
a crime unless the defendant knew it was illegal to do so.111 Similarly,
Liparota v. United States ruled out conviction for improper use of food
stamps absent knowledge that the defendant's use of food stamps was
prohibited.112
An even clearer example of ignorance-of-law defenses is Cheek v.
United States.113 The case arose out of a prosecution of a taxpayer who,
allegedly in the belief that federal tax laws did not apply to him, failed to
file income-tax returns for years on end.114 When he did happen to file
returns, he claimed an excessive number of deductions, resulting in an
underpayment of taxes. He was convicted of "willfully attempting" to
evade his federal tax obligations and "willful[ly] failing" to file federal tax
returns. 115 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, ruling that a
"good-faith misunderstanding and belief' as to the existence of a legal
duty to pay taxes and file tax returns is a complete defense.11 6 The reason
is that failing to file income-tax returns and underpaying taxes is not
blameworthy if attributable to ignorance or mistake of one's legal
obligations under the tax code.
These cases provide ample precedent for using mens rea doctrine to
require knowledge of the law in appropriate contexts. The cases,
however, do not solve the hypothetical student's dilemma. The statute
under which the student faces charges differs in two critical respects from
the laws the Supreme Court has construed to make ignorance of the law
a defense.
First, the mistake-of-law defenses that the Court has endorsed in
cases like Cheek and Liparota involved mistakes of noncriminal
law-that is, of legal rules that originate outside of the criminal code. In
Cheek, for example, the duty to file tax returns and pay taxes came from
111. 510 U.S. 135, 140, 149 (1994).
112. 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985).
113. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
114. Id. at 192.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 202.
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the Internal Revenue Code; in Liparota, the relevant body of law was the
body of regulations prohibiting certain uses of federal food stamps.117 In
the hypothetical, however, the student is not ignorant or mistaken as to
noncriminal law; indeed, as is often the case, there are no rules of
noncriminal law that determine his or her criminal liability. Rather, the
mistake is of the criminal law: the student did not know the charged
conduct is a crime.
The fact that mens rea doctrine has occasionally been used to
require knowledge of noncriminal law does not compel the conclusion
that it can be used to require knowledge of the criminal law. Courts
sharply distinguish between mistakes of criminal and noncriminal law.
Though historically receptive to mistakes involving legal rules emanating
from outside the criminal law,118 courts remain notoriously hostile to
claims that defendants did not know their conduct was a crime. As the
Supreme Court declared in Cheek v. United States:
The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense
to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.
Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law
presumed that every person knew the law. This common-law rule has been
applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes. 119
Thus, even after Liparota and its progeny, the rule that ignorance of the
criminal law is no excuse remains alive and well in the federal system.
Second, even if it might otherwise be possible to require knowledge
of the criminal law, the hypothetical crime differs in an important respect
from the situations in which ignorance of the law has been recognized as
117. Ratzlaf is harder to peg for this purpose. The prohibition on structuring was originally
contained in a statute that simply made structuring unlawful without specifying any penalties, civil or
criminal, for violating it. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)-(c) (2012). The case was brought under a separate
catch-all statute applicable to "willful violations" of a variety of federal statutory requirements and
administrative regulations. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2012) (penalty for willful violations of "this
subchapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this subchapter"). These facts might
suggest that Ratzlaf involved ignorance or mistake of noncriminal law. On the other hand, the
apparent absence of any noncriminal mechanism for enforcing the anti-structuring law (such as civil
or administrative enforcement actions against violators) might cut in the opposite direction.
118. The traditional common law rule was that mistakes of noncriminal law are a defense to
specific intent but not to general intent. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 81, § 13.02[D][2]-[3]. The
Model Penal Code recognizes such mistakes as defenses whenever they are logically relevant to negate
the mens rea required for conviction. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (AM. LAw INST. 1962).
119. 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (citations omitted). See LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 5.6(d), at 408
(discussing the continued vitality of the rule that ignorance or mistake of criminal law is no defense).
Even the Model Penal Code broadly disallows mistakes of criminal law: "Neither knowledge nor
recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning
or application of the law determining the elements of the offense is an element of such offense, unless
the definition of the offense or the Code so provides." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (AM. LAW INST.
1962). The only defense the Code offers for mistakes of criminal law involves situations in which the
government essentially caused the defendant to break the law, either by failing to publish the law in
question or falsely assuring him or her that the offending conduct was lawful. Id. § 2.04(3)(a)-(b).
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a defense. The hypothetical law is defined solely in factual terms: the
defendant must have engaged in conduct (communicate with foreign
nationals) while two circumstances exist (the call originated within the
United States and was placed to a country in which American forces were
engaged in military operations). There is no legal dimension to the
definition of the crime.
This is in sharp contrast to the crimes at issue in Liparota and
Cheek. In each case, the statute of conviction expressly defined the crime
in terms that required a violation of some independent legal rule. For
example, the statute at issue in Liparota v. United States specifically
premised criminal liability on the use of food stamps in a manner that
was not "authorized by [applicable statutes] or the regulations."120
Likewise, in Cheek, the charged tax crimes could not be committed unless
the taxpayer was "required under this title... or by regulations made
under authority thereof to make a return"121 or subject to "a[] tax imposed
by [the Internal Revenue Code]."122 By their own terms, and quite unlike
the hypothetical telecommunications crime, these statutes specifically
made criminal liability contingent upon proof of a violation of a free-
standing legal rule.
Additionally, in several of the cases in which the Supreme Court
made ignorance of the law a defense, the statutes contained an express
mens rea term which made the defendant's knowledge of the law
relevant. In several cases, the government not only had to prove a
violation of a legal rule drawn from outside the criminal code, but also
that the violation was "willful" in nature. 1 2 3 This is highly significant
because "willfulness" is often interpreted in federal criminal statutes as
requiring "'pro[of] that the defendant acted with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful."'124
To be sure, the obstruction crime charged in Arthur Andersen LLP
v. United States did not contain a willfulness requirement. 125 It did,
however, require that efforts to persuade others to obstruct a federal
120. 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012).
122. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012).
123. To be guilty, the defendant in Cheek must have "willfully fail[ed]" to file a federal income tax
return or "willfully attempt[ed]" to defeat a tax imposed by federal law. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012);
id. § 7201. In Ratzlaf v. United States, criminal penalties were available only if the defendant "willfully
violate[d]" the statutory prohibition of structuring a cash transaction to evade a bank's currency
transaction reporting requirements. 510 U.S. 135, 136 (1994); 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2012). The same
was true in Bryan v. United States, which involved a prosecution for "willfully violating" federal
firearms laws. 524 U.S. 184, 186 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (2012).
124. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137). See generally Sharon L. Davies, The
Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341(1998)
(discussing cases interpreting the requirement of "willfulness" in federal criminal statutes).
125. 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
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investigation must be "knowingly... corrupt[]" in order to be
unlawful.12 6 It was this express (and rather inelegant, even by low
congressional standards of draftsmanship) requirement that demanded
proof of "consciousness of wrongdoing." As the Court explained,
"'[c]orrupt' and 'corruptly' are normally associated with wrongful,
immoral, depraved, or evil [acts]."127
These admittedly fine distinctions in the language of criminal
statutes make all the difference to a mens rea selection methodology that
operates within the legislative definition of crimes. In Liparota v. United
States, the Court emphasized the presence of "a legal element in the
definition of the offense" as the basis for its ruling that defendants cannot
be convicted for misusing food stamps unless they knew their use of food
stamps was illegal.128 The clear suggestion is that the case would have
come out the other way had Congress not defined the crime in terms that
required a violation of food stamp regulations. Moreover, in Ratzlaf,
Cheek, and Bryan, the Court explicitly invoked the statutory term
"willfully" as the basis for its holding that the defendants could not be
convicted unless they knew their conduct was illegal.129 Again, the
implication is that knowledge of the law would not have been required in
any of these cases had Congress not included the term "willfully" into the
definition of each crime.
To the extent the new approach prevents courts from allowing
ignorance-of-law defenses to crimes that do not require proof of a legal
element or "willful" or "corrupt" action, it will be severely hampered in
126. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2012)).
127. Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705. Even so, some courts have treated statutory requirements
of "corrupt" behavior as something akin to mere surplusage. In United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144,
150 (2d Cir. 2002), a divided panel of the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that his
payment of bribes to a federal health and safety inspector was not "corrupt," as the federal bribery law
requires, because the inspector had extorted the payment from him as the price for an honest
inspection. The panel dismissed as irrelevant the risk that payments "by those facing insistent
extortionists" will be criminalized as bribes. Id. at 151. The dissent, by contrast, advocated an outcome
similar to Arthur Andersen: "if an official threatens to abuse his position in a way that will harm an
individual, and that individual then makes a payment to avoid the abuse, the individual does not act
'corruptly' because his intent is not to corrupt, but only to avoid the effects of corruption." Id. at 154-
55 (Sacks, J., dissenting).
128. 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985); see also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149 ("We do not dishonor the
venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge. In particular
contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That, we hold, is what Congress has done with
respect to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) and the provisions it controls.") (citations omitted).
129. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 196 (interpreting "the willfulness requirement of § 924(a)(1)(D)" as
requiring "knowledge that the conduct is unlawful"); Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137 ("To establish that a
defendant 'willfully violat[ed]' the antistructuring law, the Government must prove that the defendant
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 2o6-07
(1991) (holding that "it was error for the court to instruct the jury that petitioner's asserted beliefs that
wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code
should not be considered by the jury in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully").
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its stated goal of preventing punishment for morally blameless conduct.
The more innocuous the prohibited conduct, the less likely it is that
normally socialized individuals will expect the conduct to be subject to
legal regulation, much less punished as a crime. In the hypothetical
foreign-communications example, absent a widespread public awareness
campaign, there would be no reason for anyone to think that placing an
international call for legitimate purposes could be illegal.
As the hypothetical shows, obscure regulatory criminal laws create
vexing problems for the task of preventing morally undeserved
punishment. For such laws, the normal means by which citizens deal with
legal uncertainty and avoid the coercive influences of the criminal
law-namely, limiting their conduct well short of the point at which the
line separating legal and illegal conduct starts to get hazy, or not engaging
in the potentially illegal conduct at all-will be ineffective. After all, the
strategy assumes that citizens can intuit that there may be a law
applicable to their planned course of conduct. From the standpoint of
preventing punishment without culpability, obscure regulatory crimes
are problematic because the existence of such laws may very well come
as a complete surprise to ordinary citizens, and understandably so, given
how large, sprawling, and poorly defined federal criminal law is. 13 0
These are the situations in which a special rule grounded on
innocence-protection is needed most. Unfortunately, however, the new
approach will likely be unavailing in those situations. As previously
shown, Supreme Court case law provides no support for reading
knowledge-of-law requirements into statutes which do not make guilt
contingent in some way on either (1) the existence of a violation of an
independent legal rule, or (2) "willfulness" or "corrupt" behavior on the
part of the defendant. To the extent that mistake-of-law defenses are
ruled out in other contexts, the central aspiration of mens rea
doctrine-that there be a guaranteed path for acquittal for morally
blameless conduct-will remain unfulfilled, and unfulfilled in precisely
the situations in which moral innocence is most seriously threatened.
Lest this be thought to be a hypothetical problem only, consider the
Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Wilson.131 Wilson involved
130. As Professor Julie O'Sullivan has pointedly noted:
Any discussion of federal penal law must begin with an important caveat: There actually is
no federal criminal "code" worthy of the name. A criminal code is defined as 'a systematic
collection, compendium, or revision' of laws." What the federal government has is a
haphazard grab-bag of statutes accumulated over 200 years, rather than a comprehensive,
thoughtful, and internally consistent system of criminal law.
Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code"Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as a Case Study,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 643, 643 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
131. 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998).
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a defendant who was, by any definition, a very bad man: he regularly beat
his wife during their stormy marriage, and even threatened to kill her at
one point during their separation.132 Despite his obvious moral
shortcomings, the conduct for which he was jailed, possession of a
firearm while subject to an order of protection, was morally blameless
under the circumstances.133 After all, the protective order did not notify
him that he could no longer possess firearms, and it was apparently legal
under state law for him to remain in possession of his firearms after entry
of the order.134
Although he evidently obeyed all provisions in the protective order,
Wilson was prosecuted under a then-recently enacted federal statute
making it a crime for anyone "who is subject to a court order" for the
protection of an "intimate partner or child" to possess firearms.135 As
sensible as the law is, at least as applied to persons duly adjudged to be
dangerous,13 6 the Department of Justice had inexplicably made no effort
to publicize the law to the state court judges responsible for issuing and
enforcing the protective orders that trigger the federal firearms
disqualification. Wilson apparently first learned of the disqualification
when police stopped to provide him roadside assistance and saw his
weapon, at which point he was arrested.
As with the hypothetical Afghani student previously discussed,
Wilson admittedly knew all the pertinent facts. He knew he was subject
to an order of protection, and he knew he possessed a firearm. The only
thing he did not know was that upon entry of the protective order it
automatically became illegal under federal law for him to possess
firearms. The elements of the crime as defined by Congress were
insufficient to give a normally socialized person notice that entry of a
protection order, itself silent on the subject of gun possession, would
make it illegal to retain guns that were previously lawfully acquired. The
only potential ground of defense for Wilson was that he did not know it
was illegal for persons subject to protective orders to possess firearms.
132. Id. at 280.
133. Recall that mens rea doctrine requires courts to look to the blameworthiness of the charged
conduct and not of the offender. See supra note 48.
134. Wilson, 159 F.3d at 290.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012). Section 924, which provides the penalties for violations of
section 922, makes it a felony, punishable by up to ten years in prison, to "knowingly violate" section
922(g)(8). Id. § 924(a)(2) (2012).
136. Under federal law, a finding of dangerousness is not a prerequisite to forfeiture of the right to
possess firearms. All that matters is that, after notice and a hearing, a protective order has been entered
which "by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury." 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii) (2012); see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 213 (5th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting "the argument that section 922(g)(8) requires that the predicate order contain an express
judicial finding that the defendant poses a credible threat to the physical safety of his spouse or child.").
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In Wilson, Chief Judge Richard Posner astutely grasped the danger
of punishment without culpability. He began with a strong reaffirmation
of the importance of moral blameworthiness in the criminal law:
It is wrong to convict a person of a crime if he had no reason to believe that
the act for which he was convicted was a crime, or even that it was wrongful.
This is one of the bedrock principles of American law. It lies at the heart of
any civilized system of law.137
He recognized that ignorantia juris is also an established principle, but
concluded that, in cases of conflict, that "maxim of expedience" had to
yield to the "bedrock principle" that morally blameless conduct should
not be subject to punishment.138 Given that Congress provided criminal
penalties only for "knowing violations" of the federal firearms
disqualification,139 Posner would have construed the law to require proof
that "[Wilson] knew that he was committing a crime."140
Unfortunately for Wilson, however, the panel majority saw matters
very differently. In its view, the controlling legal principle was the
"traditional rule in American jurisprudence ... that ignorance of the law
is no defense to a criminal prosecution."141 Knowledge of the law could be
required only in the context of "'highly technical statutes,"' such as the
tax code, that might easily be misunderstood by the regulated public.142
No such knowledge was required in situations, such as Wilson's, where
the only problem is that the defendant was "unaware" of what the
criminal law required.143 To convict, the majority concluded, it was
enough that Wilson knew that facts that constituted the violation.
Wilson illustrates some of the key limitations inherent in existing
mens rea doctrine. The doctrine works well when the crime is defined in
terms of behavior that normally socialized individuals would suspect is
immoral or illegal. In that event, the mens rea requirement accomplishes
its purpose simply by ensuring that convicted offenders will have
understood enough about the nature of their conduct and the attendant
circumstances to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. The
137. Wilson, 159 F.3d at 293 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012) (emphasis added).
140. Wilson, 159 F.3d at 293 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Note that Posner went beyond requiring
knowledge of the law and insisted on proof that the defendant "knew that he was committing a crime."
Id. (emphasis added). In doing so, he may have required too much culpability. For moral
blameworthiness to exist, Wilson need merely have known that he was committing an illegal act as
opposed to a crime. Where the charged conduct is illegal only because it is a crime, then knowledge of
illegalityis equivalent to knowledge of criminality. This, however, is not invariablyso, as Wilson itself
shows: the prohibition on firearm possession by persons under orders of protection is set forth in a
statute other than the statute providing criminal penalties. See supra note 135.
141. Id. at 288.
142. Id. at 295 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194).
143. Id. at 289.
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approach does not work in cases like Wilson, in which the prohibited
conduct is morally innocuous activity that one would not expect to be
illegal. In these cases, even high levels of mens rea, such as purpose and
knowledge, as to the factual elements of the crime will fail to guarantee
blameworthiness.
The difficulty, in short, is that the right answer in Wilson was wrong
under existing mens-rea doctrine. The Wilson majority was correct that
statutes prohibiting "knowing" (as opposed to "willful") violations of law
are read as requiring only awareness of the facts that constitute the
violation, as opposed to the violation itself.144 In addition, federal mens-
rea doctrine provides no support whatsoever for reading knowledge-of-
law requirements into statutes, such as section 922(g)(8), that neither
demand proof of a violation of an independent legal rule as an actus reus
element nor require "willfulness" or "corrupt" behavior on the part of the
defendant. These doctrinal deficiencies are serious because, in cases such
as Wilson, they rule out the only mens rea requirement that can prevent
punishment without culpability-that is, knowledge of illegality.145
B. IMPLIED PRECLUSION OF NECESSARY MENTAL STATES
Another serious limitation in current mens rea doctrine is that
heightened mens rea requirements can be derailed by fairly weak
inferences of congressional intent. Clearly, as long as mens rea selection
operates at the level of statutory interpretation, courts will be unable to
override clear legislative choices concerning the mens rea that is
sufficient for conviction. Even so, the Supreme Court is too quick to infer
that Congress intended to preclude mens rea options that may be
essential to prevent morally undeserved punishment.
144. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) (reaffirming the view that "unless the
text of the statute dictates a different result, the term 'knowingly' merely requires proof of knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense."). One could argue, as Chief Judge Posner did in Wilson, that
"knowing violation" can be construed to required knowledge of the law where necessary to avoid
conviction for morally blameless conduct. That argument, though sensible, is hard to reconcile with
Bryan's insistence that exceptions to the usual construction of "knowing violations" as requiring
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense are warranted only when "the text of the statute"
requires them. Id. (emphasis added). Nothing in the text of the firearms statutes, fairly read, rules out
the usual construction.
145. Professor Jeffrey Meyer has collected lower court decisions involving other firearms offenses,
as well as immigration and environmental crimes, which he views as allowing punishment without
culpability. See Meyer, supra note 12, at 161-75. I do not discuss these decisions here because many
of them seem indefensible even under current doctrine. Wilson is different in this respect because it is
faithful to the current method and thus illustrates the shortcomings of the doctrine in accomplishing
its stated goal. The Posner dissent was right that blameworthiness cannot be guaranteed in cases like
Wilson without proof that the defendant knew he or she had lost the right to possess firearms upon
entry of a protective order, yet the majority was also right that existing doctrine provided no path to
that normatively correct outcome.
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Consider, for example, the decision in United States v. Yermian.146
There, the defendant was prosecuted under the false statements statute,
which provides that "whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully ... makes any materially
false ... statement" shall be guilty.147 The question presented in Yermian
was whether "knowledge" should be adopted as the mens rea for the
jurisdictional element, in which case ignorance of the existence of federal
jurisdiction would be a defense.
Under the current approach to mens rea selection, the proper
answer, at least as the Justices framed the question,148 would be to
require some level of mens rea concerning existence of federal
jurisdiction. To be sure, jurisdictional elements typically do not require
mens rea, the theory being that they do not serve to define the
wrongfulness of the prohibited act but merely tie the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction in particular cases to a constitutional basis of authority.149
Nevertheless, the false statements statute is a special case in which mens
rea should be required. As the dissent argued, unless knowledge that a
false statement implicates federal jurisdiction is a prerequisite for
conviction, any lie that happens to make its way to a federal official is a
felony, no matter how far removed from official proceedings.1o The only
sure way to forestall that sweeping result is to require proof that the
accused knew his or her lie was within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.
The key point to note is that the Yermian majority did not consider
this interpretation as even a potential reading of section 1001. The
majority concluded that the structure of the statute impliedly precluded
146. 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
147. 18 U.S.C. § tool(a) (2012).
148. The Justices did not consider the fact that section loo requires the defendant to act "willfully"
as well as "knowingly." See 18 U.S.C. § 1ool (2012) (providing that the false statements have to be
made "knowingly and willfully") (emphasis added). The fact that "willfulness" is also required is highly
salient because, as previously noted, "willfulness" is often understood to require a bad purpose to act
illegally. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92 ("[A] 'willful' act is one undertaken with 'bad purpose."').
Apparently, the Justices in Yermian assumed that, when conjoined with "knowledge" under section
iool, "willfulness" was mere surplusage that required no added culpability.
149. As Yermian noted, "[j]urisdictional language need not contain the same culpability
requirement as other elements of the offense." 468 U.S. at 68. The jurisdictional nature of the element,
however, is not dispositive. Indeed Yermian itself left open the possibility that the jurisdictional
element in the false statements offense might require some level of mens rea other than "knowledge"
(which it found to be impliedly precluded). Id. at 74-75, 75 n.14. Thus, Yermian's statement that
jurisdictional elements may not be subject to usual mens rea requirements is best understood as a
"default rule" only. See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1631 (2016).
150. See Yermian, 468 U.S. at 82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that not requiring
"knowledge" of federal jurisdiction "criminalize[s] the making of even the most casual false statements
so long as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal agency
function").
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"knowledge" as the mens rea for the jurisdictional element. The
jurisdictional element was set off by commas from the rest of the crime,
as to which Congress had expressly specified "knowledge" as the mens
rea, and the statutory "knowledge" requirement followed rather than
preceded the jurisdictional element. These structural features of section
1ool, the majority concluded, "unambiguously dispense[d] with" a
"knowledge" requirement for the jurisdictional element.151 Thus, even if
knowledge of federal jurisdiction was necessary to exempt innocent
conduct from the statute's reach, the majority considered itself powerless
to demand such proof.
It is striking just how weak the basis for the implied-preclusion
argument was in Yermian. It hardly seems likely that Congress wrote
section lool in the manner that it did in order to signal a definitive view
about what the mens rea is for the jurisdictional element. Most likely,
Congress was making sure that defendants will not face conviction unless
they knew their statements were false, without addressing the mens rea
required for other elements of the crime.152 If, as Yermian demonstrates,
legislative intent to preclude mes rea options is easily inferred from the
wording and structure of criminal statutes, then implied preclusion will
be a potential outcome in many cases in which a criminal statute contains
an express mens rea requirement.
Although Yermian predated the current mens rea methodology,
subsequent cases endorse the implied preclusion of mens rea terms.
Bates v. United States153 is a case in point. The defendant was convicted
of "knowingly and willfully misapplying" federally insured student loan
funds, in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a).154 He argued acquittal was
required absent proof that he intended to defraud the federal
government. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing a contemporaneously
enacted provision of section 1097 (subsection (d)).155 The fact that, unlike
subsection (a), subsection (d) specifically required proof of "intent to
defraud the United States" implied that Congress intended not to treat
fraudulent intent as an element of the section 1097(a) offense.15 6
Therefore, even if such intent might be necessary to exempt innocent
151. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
152. As Professor Dan Kahan has explained, "criminal statutes typically emerge from the
legislature only half-formed and must be completed through contentious, norm-laden modes of
interpretation ..... Kahan, supra note lo, at 153.
153. 522 U.S. 23 (1997).
154. Id. at 29.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 29-30.
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conduct from punishment under subsection (a), "intent to defraud" was
not an available mens rea option.157
Implied-preclusion analysis also took center stage (with a
vengeance) in Dean v. United States.158 The case involved a robber whose
gun accidentally fired as he removed cash from a bank teller's drawer.159
Apart from the unintended discharge of his weapon, he faced a five-year
mandatory minimum for "using or carrying" a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence.160 By virtue of a statutory sentence
enhancement applicable "if the firearm is discharged,"1 61 the applicable
mandatory minimum doubled to ten years. The defendant contended
that an implied mens rea requirement of "purpose" should be read into
the "discharge" element. The Court disagreed. Noting that another
sentence enhancement provision (for "brandishing" the firearm) was
expressly defined to require intentional conduct by the defendant, the
Court concluded that a mens rea of "purpose" could not be read into the
"discharge" enhancement.1 62
Dean went farther than prior implied-preclusion cases in one
important respect. Prior implied-preclusion cases deemed legislative
specification of certain mental states in other statutes (Bates) or
elsewhere in the same statute (Yermian) as precluding the Court from
reading those same mental states into parts of the offense for which
Congress required no mens rea. Dean, however, concluded that Congress
impliedly precluded any mens rea requirement for the "discharge"
element in section 924(c), resulting in strict liability on an element
essential to the description of the prohibited act (namely, discharging a
firearm during a qualifying crime). The Court explained:
Congress's use of the passive voice [in the statutory phrase "if the firearm
is discharged"] further indicates that subsection (iii) does not require proof
of intent. The passive voice focuses on an event that occurs without respect
to a specific actor, and therefore without respect to any actor's intent or
157. The Bates Court added alternatively that intent to defraud was unnecessary to avoid
ensnaring innocent conduct under subsection (a). See id. at 31, 31-32, 32 n.7 (finding that, by virtue
of the express statutory requirement of "willfulness," '"[i]nnocent . .. maladministration of a business
enterprise' or a use of funds that is simply 'unwise' does not fit within [the statute]") (citations
omitted). For present purposes, the point is simply that, apart from whatever additional culpability
the "willfulness" requirement might demand, the implied-preclusion analysis would have prevented
the Court from reading an intent-to-defraud requirement into section 1097(a) even if it had been
essential to prevent morally undeserved punishment.
158. 556 U.S. 568 (2008).
159. Id. at 570.
160. Id. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012)).
161. U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
162. Dean, 556 U.S. at 572-73.
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culpability. It is whether something happened-not how or why it
happened-that matters.163
As with Yermian, the evidence of legislative intent to preclude mens
rea in Dean was remarkably thin. The happenstance that the discharge
enhancement was framed in passive terms ("if the firearm is
discharged"), as opposed to the active voice ("if the defendant discharges
the firearm"), is an awfully weak basis on which to leap to the conclusion
that Congress displaced the usual rule that mental culpability is required
for all material elements of a federal crime. Indeed, given that a firearm
can only be discharged by the person wielding it, the statement "if the
firearm is discharged" is not materially different in meaning from "if the
firearm is discharged by the defendant," a phrasing that would negate
the Court's suggestion that it is irrelevant "how or why [the discharge]
happened."1 64
As these cases demonstrate, implied preclusion substantially
reduces the range of cases in which mens rea doctrine can prevent
morally undeserved punishment. Indeed, the use of heightened mens rea
requirements might well retain full vitality only in three contexts: (1)
where statutes are completely silent as to mens rea (such as Staples and
Elonis); (2) where all actus-reus elements essential to the
blameworthiness of the act are preceded by an express statutory mens
rea term (such as "knowingly" in Liparota); or (3) where the issue is the
meaning of an express mens rea term (such as "willfully" in Ratzlaf and
Bryan). In other cases, the government could plausibly argue that
heightened mens rea requirements should be deemed impliedly
precluded, as they were in Yermian, Bates, and Dean.165
C. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CONFUSION
The previous sections of this Part discussed two limitations inherent
in the present method of mens rea selection. The first is that, before
treating knowledge-of-law requirements as available responses to
potential punishment without culpability, the Court will demand some
163. Id. at 572 (citations omitted).
164. Id. Indeed, if the Court's suggestion that it is irrelevant "how or why" a firearm is discharged
is taken literally, the robber in Dean would have received the enhanced sentence even if the teller had
snatched the gun and fired it at him.
165. In one case, implied preclusion worked against the prosecution. In Elonis v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2003 (2015), the government argued that heightened intent requirements should not
be read into 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) because the statute provided that other prohibited threats had to be
made with intent to extort. The Court rejected the claim, reasoning that the presence of express "intent
to extort" requirements in other portions of the statute merely indicated that § 875(c) was not limited
to extortionate threats and thus left open other implied intent requirements. Id. at 2008. In most
cases, however, implied preclusion serves, as it did in Yermian, Bates, and Dean, to rule out
heightened mens rea requirements sought by criminal defendants.
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textual indication that Congress intended to require some degree of
culpability as to the legality of the defendant's conduct. The second is that
the Court will be fairly quick to rule out a mental element, no matter how
essential to guarantee culpability, if the wording or structure of a crime
might suggest that Congress did not want that element. In both cases, the
project of limiting the reach of criminal statutes in accordance with moral
blameworthiness takes a back seat to inferences of presumed legislative
intent. Why?
The answer lies in the fact that the prevailing methodology rests on
a fundamental contradiction. The first step of the mens rea analysis, at
which the Court seeks to identify the potential for morally undeserved
punishment, operates outside of the literal definition of the crime. The
Court decides whether conduct encompassed within the literal terms of
a criminal law might nonetheless be regarded as "innocent" or
"blameless." Quite inconsistently, however, the important second stage,
devoted to fashioning the heightened standards of mental culpability
necessary to guarantee blameworthiness, operates within the definition
of the offense. That is to say, the Court looks to the wording of the statute
for clues about whether or not Congress would have accepted additional,
more demanding mens rea requirements. The consequence of the
Supreme Court's literalism at the second stage is that, in many instances
in which the definition of a federal crime might well encompass
blameless conduct, courts may be unable to take ameliorative action.
Simply put, the Court is vacillating between two competing visions
of separation of powers in criminal law. The first is the textualist version
of the standard "faithful agent" model of statutory interpretation, and the
second is what I describe as the "cooperative" or "partnership" model.
The efficacy of mens rea doctrine in preventing punishment without
culpability depends critically on which model the Court ultimately
chooses. My claim is that the cooperative/partnership model is the right
model for mens rea selection, but I defer argument in support of the
normative claim until Part IV. For now, the goal is simply to sketch the
two different conceptions of the judicial role and to show the significance
for mens rea doctrine of the choice between the two models.
1. "Faithful-Agent" Textualism
Under the familiar "faithful-agent" model of statutory
interpretation, as Professor Cass Sunstein has explained, 'judges are
agents or servants of the legislature," and their charge is to "discern and
apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature."1 66 This
166. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415
(1989).
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view, though commonplace in statutory construction, would seem to be
even more significant in the context of federal criminal statutes. The
supremacy of Congress, and the illegitimacy ofjudicial crime creation, is
reflected, as Professor John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. has demonstrated, in
three bedrock principles of criminal law: the principle of legality, the rule
of lenity, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine.167 The normal emphasis
on courts being faithful agents of the legislature, combined with special
principles of judicial deference to the legislative role in crime definition,
seemingly adds up to an especially narrow role for the federal courts in
the interpretation of federal criminal statutes.
The judicial role is narrower still when textualism is factored into
the faithful-agent model. A strict textualist would argue that it is for
Congress alone to determine when conduct encompassed within the
literal terms of a federal criminal statute should be exempted from
criminal liability.168 The role of the courts is merely to determine, using
applicable canons of statutory construction, whether the charged
conduct fits within the terms of the applicable statute. If it does, then,
barring any applicable constitutional challenges or statutory defenses,
the prosecution should be allowed to proceed.
Seen in light of the postulates of faithful-agent textualism, the
limitations inherent in current mens rea doctrine are readily explained.
Congress, if it wishes, can make criminal liability dependent on a
violation of some other rule of law (such as food-stamp regulations in
Liparota or the tax code in Cheek). When it does so and writes a "legal
element" into the definition of a crime,1 69 it presumptively knows from
prior precedent that all material elements of the crime, including the
legal element itself, will require mens rea. Similarly, when Congress
includes "willfulness" or "corrupt" behavior as an element of a crime, it
presumably does so in full awareness that courts "usually" construe those
terms as making ignorance of the law a defense.170 In circumstances such
167. Jeffries, supra note 13, at 201-22. The principle of legality posits that the legislature, as the
politically accountable branch of government, is the only appropriate institution in a democratic
society to make the fundamental policy choice concerning what should, and should not, be a crime.
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 202. Similarly, the rule of lenity requires (or at least purports to require)
courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowlyin favor of the defendant. Jeffries, supra note
13, at 198. Finally, vagueness doctrine limits enforcement of statutes which are so indefinite and
susceptible to abuse as to shift the legislative crime-definition authority to law enforcers and,
ultimately, judges. Jeffries, supra note 13, at 197.
168. As Justice Thomas wrote for the Court in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001), the enforcement of non-statutory defenses is "controversial"
because "under our constitutional system ... federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by
common law."
169. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985).
170. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998) (noting that "willfulness" is "usually"
construed to require a bad purpose to commit an illegal act); see also Arthur Anderson LLP v. United
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as these, the statutory text itself may be read as suggesting that Congress
intended to demand proof of consciousness of wrongdoing, and the
Court, as a faithful agent of Congress, is quite willing to follow the
perceived legislative command.
On the other hand, a Court committed to faithful-agent textualism
will not impose heightened mens rea requirements when the text does
not invite such requirements. When Congress elects to define a crime
without reference to any legal element, and omits terms that might be
taken to require knowledge of illegality, the inference is that Congress did
not intend to require any mens rea as to the legality of the prohibited
conduct. The presumption here is that Congress endorsed the maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse. In light of the textualist faithful-
agent model, it makes sense that the Court would not consider itself free
in this context to condition criminal liability on proof that the defendant
knew that his conduct was illegal.
The same goes for implied preclusion. Where Congress prescribes a
particular mens rea requirement for one crime but not another closely
related crime, a textualist-minded judge will readily infer that the
omission was intentional.171 After all, the fact that the mens rea was
written into one crime shows that Congress knew how to impose that
mens rea requirement when it wanted. To be sure, there might be any
number of explanations for the omission of the mens rea contained in
one statute from a related provision, which is one reason why "expressio
unius" (sometimes called the "negative-implication canon") is regarded
as "controversial" among legislation scholars.172 For a Court, however,
that is both textualist and highly deferential to Congress, the allure of
implied preclusion is understandably hard to resist.
It is thus easy to explain the limitations embedded in the prevailing
method of mens rea selection in terms of the textualist, faithful-agent
model of the separation of powers. The hard part is seeing the
justification for the project of enforcing implied mens rea requirements
on the postulates of that model. If the textual literalism which drives the
analysis at the mens rea selection stage were applied to the antecedent
question of whether it is proper for courts to create and enforce mens rea
requirements not prescribed by Congress, it would be difficult to answer
in the affirmative.
Given that Congress knows how to prescribe mens rea requirements,
and does so with regularity, a straightforward case can be made on the
States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (stating that "'[c]orrupt' and 'corruptly' are normally associated with
wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil [acts]").
171. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1724-25 (2004).
172. Id. at 1724, 1724 n.223.
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postulates of faithful-agent textualism that courts have no business
requiring mens rea for crimes or elements as to which Congress required
no mental culpability. To do so, after all, is to propel the courts to some
degree into the legislative role of deciding what should and should not be
a crime. In essence, by creating implied mens rea requirements essential
to conviction, courts are exercising the power to decriminalize conduct
that, judging from the statutory text alone, Congress seemingly intended
to condemn as criminal.
To be sure, the requirement of mens rea has a long distinguished
lineage in the common law. The "guilty mind" requirement has been an
established feature of Anglo-American criminal law for centuries.173
Within the federal system, it has been settled judicial practice for decades
that intent to impose strict liability will not be inferred from legislative
silence and that federal crimes require mens rea designed to prevent
morally undeserved punishment.174 These facts surely put Congress on
notice that a morally culpable (or "guilty") state of mind is an essential
feature of criminal liability and will be prescribed by the courts when
omitted from the legislative definition of the offense. Consequently,
judicial authority to create and enforce implied mens rea requirements
in federal cases seems beyond serious dispute.
A strict adherent of faithful-agent textualism might nonetheless
recoil at the prospect of judges requiring mens rea in contexts where
Congress failed to do so. The argument would be that, by using judicially
created mens rea requirements to exempt from punishment conduct
which satisfies the literal definition of a federal crime, the Court is
making policy choices that do not flow from statutory text. From the
standpoint of faithful-agent textualism, Congress alone is institutionally
competent to make such choices, and its choices must be respected by the
courts, not supplemented or overridden.
In another context, the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to
take the postulates of the textualist faithful-agent model to their logical
extreme. In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,175
a case involving whether necessity is a valid defense to federal drug
charges, the majority opinion contained sweeping dicta questioning the
propriety of judicial enforcement of necessity (and, by extension, other
non-statutory criminal defenses). Absent codification by statute, the
Court viewed non-statutory defenses as "controversial" because "federal
crimes are defined by statute rather than by common law."176 Just as
173. See supra note 6.
174. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
175. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
176. Id. at 490.
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crime-definition questions are for Congress to decide, the question
"'[w]hether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created [from a
criminal statute] is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial
inference."'177
Ultimately, the Court did not decide the propriety of non-statutory
criminal defenses and rested on a narrower ground for decision,17 3 but it
is difficult to imagine a more striking illustration of faithful-agent
textualism at work in federal criminal law. If longstanding congressional
acquiescence in defenses as deeply rooted in the common law and
prevailing judicial practice as necessity does notjustify continued judicial
enforcement of those defenses, then the longstanding practice of reading
judicially created mens rea requirements into statutes silent on mens rea
is equally suspect. After all, the purpose and effect of reading mens rea
requirements into criminal statutes is to create, on judicial initiative
alone, a defense for persons lacking the state of mind deemed essential
by the courts.
2. The "Cooperative/Partnership"Model
To the extent the Court continues to ignore the radical suggestion in
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, and remains in the business of
enforcing judicially created mens rea requirements, it must be because
the Court is not fully committed to the textualist faithful-agent model in
this context. Under a very different conception of separation of powers,
which I call the "cooperative/partnership model," crime definition is not
left solely to Congress. The initial responsibility for determining what
should be punishable as a crime and defining the prohibited act is for
Congress. Once the initial criminalization decision is made, however, the
judiciary has an important lawmaking role to play in rounding out the
definition of statutory crimes. Thus, on this model, crime definition is not
the exclusive responsibility of Congress but rather a responsibility that is
shared by the legislature and judiciary alike, with each cooperating, in
their respective ways, to achieve the legislative objectives while keeping
criminal liability within appropriate bounds.
The cooperative/partnership model has evolved into a kind of
institutional division of labor between Congress and the courts in
criminal cases. Congress focuses primarily on defining the prohibited act
and grading the offense. The definition of the mental element of federal
177. Id. (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979)).
178. As the Court unanimously ruled, the Controlled Substances Act clearly shows that Congress
rejected the notion that marijuana and other "Schedule I" drugs have any accepted use that would
justify the manufacture or distribution of such drugs outside of certain federally approved research
programs. Id. at 491.
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crimes, however, is left principally to the courts. Naturally, when
Congress has selected a particular mens rea option, the choice is binding
upon the courts. Courts are otherwise impliedly delegated the power to
flesh out the mental elements of the crime in light of background
principles of the criminal law, including the notion that "an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention."179
The pattern of congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting federal criminal statutes supplies strong evidence of this
dynamic. It has long been known that Congress is far more likely to
override narrow interpretations of criminal statutes than expansive
ones.1So What has eluded notice is that certain kinds of narrow
interpretations are more likely to be overridden than others. It is
decisions limiting the actus reus of federal crimes (and thus restricting
prosecutorial charging authority) that are overridden most frequently.
Congress, however, only rarely overrides decisions imposing heightened
mens rea requirements. For example, from the time of Liparota to the
present, Congress has acquiesced in all but one of the Supreme Court
decisions imposing heightened mens rea requirements. 11
179. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 2476, 250 (1952). There is an obvious parallel between
the cooperative/partnership model and the familiar administrative law concept of "Chevron
deference." In administrative law, the presence of gaps in statutes committed to the administration of
federal agencies is understood as an implicit congressional delegation of lawmaking power authorizing
the agencies to fill those gaps as they see fit within the broad bounds of permissible textual and policy
choices. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). The
cooperative/partnership model in federal criminal law operates quite similarly, with judges rather
than agencies assisting Congress in the making of federal law. When, as is often the case, Congress
fails to specify the mens rea required for each element of the offense, the Court essentially treats it as
a delegation of authority to the judiciary to flesh out the unspecified standards of mental culpability in
the manner it deems appropriate, as opposed merely to giving meaning to the precise words used in
the text. For a provocative exploration of the implications of Chevron for federal criminal cases, see
Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 1O HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996).
18o. Based on a study of congressional overrides of statutory interpretation decisions by the
Supreme Court, Professor William Eskridge found that:
[W]hen [criminal law decisions] are overridden, they follow a predictable pattern: the
Court's relatively libertarian positions are often overruled by law-and-order overrides that
reset the legal rule in favor of prosecutors and the state. The results are even more dramatic
for habeas corpus overrides, all fifteen of which went against prisoners, and in favor of
prosecutors and the states, in the period we studied (1967-2011).
Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1317, 1398-99 (2014).
181. Ratzlaf v. United States is the exception that was changed by statute. After Ratzlaf was
decided, Congress left in place the law there at issue but enacted a new one, identical to the prior
version, minus the express "willfulness" requirement construed in Ratzlaf. See generally Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, lo8 Stat. 2160
(1994). Apart from Ratzlaf, Congress has allowed to stand all of the Court's decisions imposing stricter
mens rea standards. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 18o, app. 1 (listing overridden decisions
by subject matter).
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The fact that Congress is considerably more likely to override
decisions narrowing the actus reus than decisions imposing heightened
mens rea requirements is highly significant. It suggests that Congress
jealously guards its primacy in defining the conduct element of federal
crimes but recognizes shared judicial responsibility for defining the
mental element of crimes. Stated differently, Congress views the courts
as partners in the effort to define federal crimes but expects judges to
focus their efforts on the mental element while deferring to legislative
choices concerning the conduct element. Viewed through the lens of the
cooperative/partnership model, then, the Court's willingness to assist
Congress by fleshing out the incompletely specified mental element of
federal crimes is both defensible and sound.
As a consequence, it is to be expected that the two stages of the
prevailing method of mens rea selection are working at cross-purposes.
Those stages are based on two very different, and mutually exclusive,
conceptions of the proper role of the courts in federal crime definition.
The first step of the new method, which instructs courts to use implied
mens rea requirements to carve blameless conduct out of the reach of
criminal statutes, assumes the cooperative/partnership model: courts
can limit the reach of federal criminal laws through judicially fashioned
mens rea requirements, utilizing authority Congress has implicitly
delegated for this purpose.
At the second stage of the mens rea analysis, however, the paradigm
abruptly shifts to faithful-agent textualism. In deciding what mens rea
requirement to impose, courts must pay close attention to potential clues
in the statutory text concerning legislative intent. Courts cannot impose
knowledge-of-law requirements without some textual indication that
Congress wanted to predicate the defendant's guilt on consciousness of
wrongdoing. Additionally, courts often infer from the presence of express
mens rea requirements and the phrasing of statutes legislative intent to
preclude judicial adoption of mens rea requirements essential to prevent
punishment without culpability. Little wonder, then, that the second
stage of the analysis is limited in ways that prevent courts from fully
accomplishing the doctrine's goal of limiting punishment in accordance
with desert.
IV. TOWARDS REAL INNOCENCE-PROTECTION
The analysis so far has been somewhat gloomy: yes, the Supreme
Court has identified a real problem (incompletely defined federal crimes
that all too often fail to preclude the potential for morally unjustified
punishment), and, yes, the Court has chosen an appropriate vehicle (the
mens rea requirement) to try and solve the problem, but, for a variety of
reasons, that vehicle simply will not get the Court where it wants to go.
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This Part identifies several reforms that will improve the effectiveness of
mens rea doctrine in accomplishing its important goals.
Note, at the outset, these reforms would only make mens rea
doctrine better at preventing punishment that is not morally deserved.
They would not, however, make the doctrine perfect. Only strictly
enforced constitutional standards can have any hope of guaranteeing that
punishment will, in all cases, be limited according to blameworthiness.
As long as constitutional law continues to fail to provide robust
guarantees against unjust punishment, it is all the more imperative that
mens rea doctrine effectively protect "innocence."
A. REDEFINING "INNOCENCE"
The Supreme Court should build upon the example of Elonis v.
United States12 and declare, in no uncertain terms, that exempting
morally blameless conduct from punishment is not the only goal of mens
rea doctrine. A separate, equally vital goal is to ensure that the sanctions
available in the event of conviction will be proportional to the
blameworthiness of the prohibited act. Imposing punishment in excess
of blameworthiness is just as offensive in principle as convicting
blameless conduct because, either way, courts are imposing punishment
that is not justified by the culpability of the offender's act. This is what
real innocence-protection entails, and it is the kind of "innocence" that
mens rea doctrine has traditionally served to protect against conviction.
To have any hope of precluding morally undeserved punishment,
courts must do more than simply adjust mens rea requirements to
guarantee some modicum of moral blameworthiness. It is necessary to
match up the level of culpability for a particular offense with the
maximum penalties applicable to that offense. Crimes for which
Congress has prescribed severe penalties should require correspondingly
high levels of mens rea (such as purpose or knowledge) so that offenders
will be seriously blameworthy. Only then will convicted offenders be
morally deserving of the stiff penalties federal law routinely affords.
It would be relatively easy to build proportionality into the
prevailing mens rea methodology. Courts should identify, at the first
stage of the analysis, the actus reus and mens rea elements set forth in
the statute defining the offense, as well as any additional elements the
prosecution accepts as essential for conviction. The next step is to
attempt to hypothesize blameless conduct that would satisfy all elements
of the crime. If it is possible to imagine blameless conduct that would
violate the statute in question, courts should impose an additional mens
182. 135 S. Ct. 2001(2015).
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rea requirement sufficient to exempt all potential blameless conduct
from the reach of the statute and ensure that any blameworthy conduct
within its reach is sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the penalties it
affords. So far, with one caveat, this is the same analysis the Supreme
Court currently employs.183
It is at this point that an analysis aimed at preventing morally
undeserved punishment in all of its forms significantly diverges from the
existing analytical method. Even if heightened mens rea requirements
are unnecessary in a particular context to exempt blameless conduct
from the scope of a statute, the mens rea analysis is not yet finished.
Instead, in situations where culpability is already guaranteed by the
definition of the crime, courts must then ask the proportionality
question: is the conduct that violates the statute blameworthy enough, as
a moral matter, to warrant the penalties authorized by statute? If not,
then the Court should impose an additional mens rea requirement to
ensure that the sanctions available upon conviction will be proportional
to the gravity of the offender's crime.
To see the critical difference a proportionality-based approach
would make, consider Dean v. United States,184 the case involving a bank
robber whose gun accidentally (and, thankfully, harmlessly) fired inside
the bank. Clearly, mens rea was not required on the "discharge" element
to avoid punishment without culpability. He was, after all, intentionally
engaged in the commission of a bank robbery and brandishing a loaded
firearm in the commission of a violent crime, both seriously blameworthy
acts. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of proportionality of
punishment, it makes no sense to subject bank robbers whose weapons
accidentally discharge to the same ten-year mandatory minimum
applicable to criminals who purposely threaten grave injury or death by
intentionally firing their weapons. A requirement that the defendant
must have purposefully discharged a firearm in order to receive the strict
ten-year mandatory minimum would have reserved the "discharge"
enhancement for the most blameworthy cases Congress likely had in
mind-the proverbial "shoot-em-up" criminal who chooses to put
innocent lives at risk. Importantly, those, like Dean, whose guns fired
accidentally, would not escape serious punishment on my approach.
Instead, they would be sentenced within the basic punishment range for
using or carrying a firearm during a qualifying crime, with the eventual
183. The difference is that, as previously explained, proportionality concerns were not explicitly
acknowledged as a factorin mens rea selection prior toElonis. Instead, proportionality was given effect
sub rosa, and only in response to an identified potential for punishment without culpability, resulting
in what I have termed "back-door proportionality." See Smith, supra note 11, at 137-44 (discussing
"back-door" proportionality).
184. 556 U.S. 568 (2009).
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sentence calibrated under the Sentencing Guidelines to the defendants'
precise level of culpability.
At the same time, factoring proportionality concerns into the
analysis will not uniformly require heightened mens rea requirements.
In situations where the crime is already sufficiently defined to prevent
morally undeserved punishment, courts may not demand proof of
additional mental culpability. Heightened mens rea requirements are
warranted on the approach defended here only where, absent such
requirements, there is a risk of morally undeserved punishment.
Consequently, the Supreme Court properly declined to impose
heightened mens rea requirements in Shaw v. United StatesS5 and
Bryan v. United States.186 The defendant in Shaw argued that, to be
guilty of bank fraud, it was not enough that he intended to defraud bank
depositors of funds held in their accounts. Instead, the government had
to prove the defendant intended to defraud the bank itself. The argument
was properly rejected because defrauding depositors is not only seriously
blameworthy, but also morally equivalent to defrauding the bank.
Similarly, in Bryan, a prosecution for willfully violating the federal
prohibition of dealing in firearms without a license, the statute already
demanded serious culpability which fully justified the sanctions
authorized by Congress. The law allowed conviction only if the accused
actually knew his or her dealing in firearms was unlawful, a seriously
culpable mental state even if the accused was unaware of the precise law
he or she violated. The Court thus quite properly refused to require actual
knowledge by the defendant of the specific legal violation committed.
B. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CLARITY
Once the Court recognizes that innocence-protection in the broadest
sense is the goal of mens rea doctrine, the next step is for the Supreme
Court to free the courts from the doctrine's self-defeating limitations.
These limitations make it difficult, if not impossible, for courts to
guarantee culpability-let alone, culpability and proportionality-in all
federal criminal prosecutions. The time has come for the Court to stop
vacillating between two contradictory conceptions of its institutional role
in criminal cases-the textualist faithful-agent and
cooperative/partnership models-and to be clear about which of the
models represents the governing paradigm for mens rea selection. Unless
the Court is willing to abandon its stated desire to achieve innocence-
protection, the choice between the two models of the separation of
powers should be made based on which of those models can best further
185. 137 S. Ct. 462 (2016).
186. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
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the goal of preventing morally undeserved punishment. So viewed, the
proper choice is clear: the cooperative/partnership model is the model
that should be adopted.
Congress needs and expects the assistance of the courts in
prescribing standards of mental culpability. In rendering that assistance
through judicially created mens rea requirements, courts are not
intruding on the legislative turf or being "faithless" agents frustrating
congressional policy choices. What they are doing instead is fulfilling the
intent of Congress by performing the role the legislature expects of them
in fleshing out the definition of incomplete crimes.
Time and again, Congress has acquiesced in the Supreme Court's
approach to the guilty mind requirement. Long before the cases giving
rise to the prevailing mens rea method, Congress remained silent in the
face of longstanding rulings that legislative silence as to mens rea does
not result in strict liability'87 and that strict liability is
disfavored'88-rulings that were quite explicitly motivated by the desire
to prevent morally undeserved punishment. Of the three cases in the
trilogy that gave rise to the current approach to mens rea (Liparota,
Ratzlaf, and Staples), Congress overrode only one (Ratzlaj) and allowed
the other two to stand even though Staples involved a politically salient
issue (gun control) and Liparota imposed an unusually high mens rea
requirement (knowledge of the law). As previously noted, Ratzlaf stands
as the only mens rea decision by the Court to have been legislatively
overridden.1 89 This is particularly striking given how receptive Congress
is in general to pleas by the Department of Justice to overturn rulings
favoring criminal defendants.19o
In any one case, it would be hazardous to infer legislative approval
of a court decision from subsequent congressional inaction. Even so, it is
unthinkable that Congress would remain silent if it disapproved of the
longstanding judicial practice of limiting the reach of federal crimes
through implied mens rea requirements and of using mens rea as a
bulwark against morally undeserved punishment. The only sensible
conclusion to be drawn is that Congress shares the Court's normative
commitment to limiting punishment in accordance with
187. See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
188. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
189. See supra note 181 (discussing statutory overrides).
190. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 180 (citing "the popularity of anticrime and
antiprisoner measures," as well as "the credibility of the Department of Justice and the dearth of
powerful interests opposing the Department when it seeks an override," as reasons that statutory
overrides overwhelmingly go against criminal defendants); see also Stuntz, supra note 13, at 546-47
(demonstrating that legislators and prosecutors are natural allies against the interests of criminal
defendants).
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blameworthiness and accepts as legitimate the judicial role in fleshing
out the mental element of federal crimes.
One might legitimately ask: why leave innocence-protection to the
courts if Congress truly wishes to prevent morally undeserved
punishment? Undoubtedly, Congress could (and should) do more on its
own to avoid unwarranted overbreadth and overpunishment in federal
criminal law. For example, it could write narrower criminal statutes,
streamline and modernize the sprawling roster of federal criminal
statutes, and enact into federal law the culpability structure and mens rea
terminology of the Model Penal Code-not to mention pass long-overdue
sentencing reform.191 Does the fact that Congress has done the opposite
on many of these points, allowing overcriminalization and
overpunishment to persist, suggest that Congress does not really care
about limiting punishment in accordance with desert? The answer is
"no."
The political economy of federal criminal law makes it exceedingly
difficult and costly for Congress to achieve meaningful innocence-
protection on its own. In passing criminal statutes, Congress faces an
institutional dilemma. It cannot foresee the full range of anti-social
behavior that criminals might engage in years down the road. It can only
legislate prospectively.192 Additionally, prosecutors and courts can only
respond to unforeseen types of future criminal activity if Congress has
previously given them the necessary statutory authority.193 In this
climate, passing narrowly tailored statutes might well result in gaps in
the coverage of federal criminal law, gaps through which some future
offenders may escape conviction. The risk of gaps is reduced by writing
overbroad statutes, 194 but that strategy has serious costs of its own. The
191. See generally Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537,565-79 (2012); Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future,
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45 (1998). The Model Penal Code's greatest innovation was that it streamlined
the large, vague, and inconsistently interpreted universe of common law mens rea terms into four
carefully defined terms (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence) and provided strict
interpretive rules making it possible to determine, ex ante, the mens rea required for each and every
material element of a Code offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAw INST. 1962).
Unfortunately, "[t]he present federal criminal code is not significantly different in form from the
alphabetical listing of offenses that was typical of American codes in the 1800s." Paul H. Robinson &
Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 1o NEW CRIM. L. REv. 319,
327(2007).
192. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
193. There are, in other words, no common law crimes in the federal system. See United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime,
affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court shall have jurisdiction of the offence.").
194. See generally Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A
Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012); Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008).
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precise reach of the statute will often be unclear at or near the margin,
and the statute may well encompass "innocent" or other behavior that
Congress would not have wanted to criminalize, or result in more severe
punishment than even Congress intended.195
For a Congress that has almost completely federalized crime in the
apparent belief that for virtually any crime there must be a remedy (or
multiple remedies) in federal court,19 6 there is but one acceptable
resolution of the above dilemma. Given such a stark choice, Congress will
err on the side of criminalizing too much rather than too little.197 In other
words, Congress will tend to enact crimes in which mens rea
requirements are not fully spelled out and the actus reus is cast in broad,
often ambiguous terms-terms which, if read literally, could encompass
morally innocent conduct as well as blameworthy conduct that might
otherwise merit lower punishment.193
The key point in this dynamic is why Congress writes overbroad
criminal statutes. It does so not because it wants to convict the morally
innocent or punish in excess of blameworthiness. It does so, rather, to
ensure that the morally guilty in the future (whoever they might turn out
to be) will not escape the long arm of the Department of Justice. Once
this dynamic is understood, it becomes clear that the federal judiciary has
an important, and quite legitimate, lawmaking role to play in rounding
out the definition of incomplete crimes and, in particular, in taking
"innocence" into account in delineating the proper scope of criminal
liability.
The faithful-agent textualism model simply does not make sense in
light of the cooperative arrangement that has emerged in which courts
and Congress together share the responsibility for defining the mental
elements of federal crimes. Whether or not that model is right in other
contexts (and it may very well be), the Court should reject that model for
purposes of mens rea selection, an enterprise which makes no sense
except under the cooperative/partnership model of the separation of
195. See generally Smith, supra note lo6.
196. The explosion of federal criminal law is documented in TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION
OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (James A. Strazzella rptr.,
1998).
197. Professor Daniel Richman has explained this phenomenon in terms of the incentives facing
legislators: Members of Congress, as the only actors who can supply federal criminal legislation, bear
the risk of being blamed if there is no statute allowing a dangerous criminal to be convicted, whereas
"the executive branch, not the legislative, takes the political heat for inappropriate prosecutions."
Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federaland Local Law Enforcement, 2 CRIM.
JUST. 81, 89 (1999). For a detailed exploration of why the incentives facing legislators almost always
favor broader liability rules, see Stuntz, supra note 13.
198. See Smith, supra note 1o6, at 893-930 (demonstrating how expansive interpretation of
federal criminal statutes has served to drive up the available punishment for criminal conduct).
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powers in criminal law. This would mean that, as long as they respect
clearly expressed legislative choices, courts have free rein to require
whatever mens rea they believe necessary to prevent morally undeserved
punishment. Textual literalism, supplemented by the venerable rule of
lenity and other canons of statutory construction, has a place in federal
criminal cases only as to the actus reus of the crime, as to which courts
are relegated to the usual interpretive posture of searching for and
carrying out legislative intent. As applied to mens rea questions,
however, textual literalism would prevent the courts from performing the
shared lawmaking role that Congress both needs and expects them to
perform and that courts have performed for decades.
Once faithful-agent textualism is seen as inapposite to mens rea
selection, it becomes possible to save existing doctrine from the self-
defeating limitations that undermine its efficacy. Two basic reforms are
needed. First, the Supreme Court should make clear that courts can, and
should, require knowledge of the law whenever necessary to guarantee
culpability and proportionality, and that the propriety of such
requirements does not depend on any kind of "magic words" or other
signals from Congress. Second, when a court has determined that a
particular mens rea requirement (including but not limited to knowledge
of the law) is necessary to prevent morally undeserved punishment, it
should be very reluctant to infer that the necessary mens rea option is
precluded by implication. These proposed reforms are elaborated upon
below.
1. Ignorance of the Law
The time has finally come for the Supreme Court to relegate
ignorantia juris to the ash heap of legal history. Except if textually
foreclosed, all mens rea options-even ignorance of the criminal
law-should be available whenever there is a danger of exposing
blameless behavior to punishment or blameworthy behavior to excessive
punishment. As this phrasing suggests, knowledge of the law should no
longer be treated as some extreme, presumptively illegitimate mens rea
option reserved for truly exceptional situations. It is merely one of many
potential mens rea options available to courts. Barring contrary direction
from Congress, courts should choose whichever option best serves the
goals of mens rea doctrine in particular contexts.
Note that clear textual rejection of knowledge of the law (or any
other potential mens rea requirement) as an element of the offense must
be respected. This is so because, on any coherent theory of statutory
construction, the intent of Congress, clearly expressed in statutory text,
binds the courts. As a result, Congress is free to reject heightened mens
rea requirements, either through clear language included in the
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definition of the offense or (as with Ratzlaf) legislative overrides of
decisions imposing such requirements. These possibilities, however, are
unavoidable as long as mens rea doctrine operates at the level of statutory
interpretation. Absent clear text to the contrary (which, apart from
overrides, will rarely if ever exist), courts should not hesitate to demand
knowledge of the criminal law if necessary to prevent morally undeserved
punishment.
Whether knowledge of the law or other heightened standards of
mental culpability can be required should turn on the answers to two
questions. First, can culpability and proportionality of punishment be
guaranteed without more stringent mens rea requirements? Second,
does the statutory text clearly indicate that Congress intended to reject
the necessary state of mind as an element of the offense? If either
question is answered in the affirmative, then it would be improper for the
court to impose the element. Otherwise, courts should ratchet up the
required mens rea to the level necessary to prevent morally undeserved
punishment, without insisting upon "magic words" or other indicia of
congressional openness to that result.
Also, if a "magic words" approach is to be retained, the Supreme
Court should abandon the presumption that "knowingly violates" merely
requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. In
Bryan v. United States,199 it made sense to read "knowingly violates" as
requiring factual knowledge only because there would otherwise have
been no way to distinguish "knowing violations" from "willful
violations."200 The presence within the same statute of provisions
treating "knowing" and "willful" violations as distinct offenses clearly
indicated, as the Court held in Bryan, that a "willful violation" requires
knowing illegality. The choice between the two potential interpretations
of "knowing violation" in other contexts should turn solely on whether or
not factual knowledge is sufficient to prevent morally unjustified
punishment.
With this reformed approach, cases like United States v. Wilson201
become easy. Whether or not people should anticipate that their right to
possess firearms will be affected by entry of an order of protection that is
silent on the issue, their failure to anticipate that result is not sufficiently
blameworthy to warrant conviction for a felony punishable by up to ten
years in prison. On the precise issue before the court, the dissent by Chief
Judge Posner was correct that, to be guilty of a "knowing violation," the
199. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
200. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(B) (2012) (knowing violations), with id. § 924(a)(1)(D)
(willful violations); see also id. § 924(d)(1) (prohibiting both knowing violations and willful
violations).
201. 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998).
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government had to prove the defendant knew that it was illegal for him
to possess firearms upon entry of an order of protection.202
There may be one notable difference between Posner's analysis in
Wilson and mine. The difference is best illustrated through a
hypothetical. Suppose that Congress had not required a "knowing
violation" of the firearms disqualification and had settled instead just for
a "violation." It is unclear whether Posner would have reached the same
interpretive result in that situation. To the extent his interpretation
hinged on the fact that Congress had required "knowledge" as the
existence of the violation, he may have had no way to avoid reaching the
majority's result other than to roll out what he called the "heavy artillery
of constitutional law."203 Not so under my approach, however.
Under my approach, mens rea selection does not depend on "magic
words" (such as "willful violation" or "knowing violation"). The question,
as in the actual case, would simply be whether knowledge-of-law
requirements are essential to innocence-protection and, if so, whether
such requirements are textually foreclosed. Because the answers to these
questions are "yes" and "no," respectively, the outcome would be
unchanged: the government would have had to prove that the defendant
knew that his possession of firearms was unlawful.204
Far from imposing insuperable obstacles to prosecution, wider
availability of ignorance of law defenses will be socially beneficial in
many cases. In cases involving obviously wrongful conduct or furtive
behavior by defendants to conceal their activities, common-sense juries
can be trusted to reject ignorance of law defenses. In other cases, where
the criminal law might otherwise act as a trap for the unwary, treating
ignorance of the law as a defense would promote justice in a variety of
ways. It would, first and foremost, exempt from punishment persons who
acted in good faith, without awareness of wrongdoing, but leave the
government free to utilize any available civil and administrative remedies
against violators who cannot be convicted. Furthermore, ignorance of
law defenses will give government officials greater incentives to publicize
new or obscure legal requirements, affording well-meaning members of
the regulated public the notice they need to avoid being branded a
criminal. In cases like Wilson, for example, it is in everyone's best interest
(especially protected parties) that protective orders clearly inform
202. See id. at 293 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
204. This does not mean that my approach would make the "knowledge" requirement superfluous.
The "knowledge" requirement serves to guarantee that culpability will be required as to the existence
of the federal firearms violation. Had Congress not written that requirement into the statute, there
would have been no statutory guarantee that culpability would be required as to the existence of the
violation.
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persons accused of domestic violence that they may not possess firearms.
There is, in short, no reason for courts to shrink from requiring
knowledge of the law where necessary to prevent injustice.
2. Implied Preclusion
With one exception, the implied-preclusion doctrine should be
abandoned. Courts do not presume that congressional failure to
prescribe mens rea requirements necessitates strict liability.205 Neither
should they necessarily presume that the omission in one statute of a
mens rea requirement included in a related provision, or that the
presence of a mens rea requirement applicable to one element of a crime
but not others, results in preclusion of that mens rea. Unless there is a
much clearer textual indication that Congress intended to reject a
particular mens rea requirement, courts should be free to require any
level of mens rea that is necessary either to avoid conviction for morally
blameless conduct or the infliction of disproportionate punishment. That
is to say, mens rea selection must work outside of, rather than within, the
definition of the offense. The driving force of the analysis should simply
be whether or not heightened standards of mental culpability are
essential to achieve the twin goals of mens rea doctrine.20 6
For an example of this considerably narrower approach to implied
preclusion, consider United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.2 0 7 The case
involved a prosecution against a distributor of pornographic films for
selling child pornography. The statute expressly provided that the
conduct elements of the crime, such as distributing or transporting
"visual depictions," had to be "knowing." It was open to serious question,
however, whether the "knowledge" requirement applied to the remaining
elements of the crime. This was important because it was the elements
listed later in the statute-specifically, the fact that the visual depiction
was pornographic in nature and involved underage performers-that
pertained to the blameworthiness of the regulated conduct and the
proportionality of the harsh penalties Congress provided.208
205. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
206. The exception, in which implied-preclusion is the right outcome, involves lesser-included
crimes in which the only difference between the two offenses is a specified mens rea requirement. For
example, possession of controlled substances is a crime, but the same act is a more severely punished
crime if committed "with intent to distribute." Compare, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) (possession
with intent), with id. § 844(a) (simple possession). In this situation, reading an "intent to distribute"
requirement into the crime of simple possession would make the lesser crime completely redundant,
frustrating the obvious intent of Congress that simple possession, for purposes other than distribution,
should be a crime in its own right.
207. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
208. The statute made it a crime, in pertinent part, to "knowingly receive[], or distribute[], any
visual depiction ... if-(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging
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The Court required knowledge as to both of these critical elements.
In doing so, it conceded that "[t]he most natural grammatical
reading ... suggests that the term 'knowingly' modifies only the
surrounding verbs" and does "not modify the elements of the minority of
the performers, or the sexually explicit nature of the material, because
they are set forth in independent clauses separated by interruptive
punctuation."209 Justice Scalia, in dissent, thought this concession was
an "understatement to the point of distortion-rather like saying that the
ordinarily preferred total for two plus two is four."210 Nevertheless, the
Court, in part for innocence-protection reasons (and in part to avoid free-
speech problems), held that the defendant must have known the visual
depictions involved minors engaging in sexually explicit activity.211
Even apart from perceived constitutional doubts, the Court reached
the correct result on innocence-protection grounds. Justice Scalia's
interpretation was superior from the standpoint of faithful-agent
textualism, but, as I have argued, that is not the right model for mens rea
selection. To give preclusive significance to the fact that the elements
pertaining to the nature of the images happened to be set off in separate
subsections, distant from the express "knowledge" requirement
applicable to the antecedent conduct elements of the crime, would
presuppose that Congress implicitly decided what the mens rea should
(or should not) be for each element of this fairly complexly structured
crime. That, unfortunately, is simply not how Congress approaches the
definition of federal crimes.
Absent much clearer textual evidence that Congress intended to
dispense with "knowledge" as to the precise nature of the visual
depictions, the Court was correct to require proof that the defendant was
knowingly trafficking in child pornography. Without that high level of
mens rea, it would impossible to guarantee that convicted offenders
would be sufficiently blameworthy to deserve the severe penalties that
Congress had authorized.212 The Court got this one right, and the reforms
in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)
(2012).
209. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68.
210. Id. at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia would have held that knowledge was not required as to
either the pornographic nature of the visual depiction or the underage status of one of the performers
and, for that reason, would have struck the statute down on First Amendment grounds.
211. Id. at 67.
212. As I have explained in prior work:
[T]rafficking in child pornography is a very serious crime, and it is punished so severely
because the creation of child pornography inflicts serious harms on the children used to
produce it. Not surprisingly, the penalties that Congress has authorized for trafficking in
obscene adult pornography pale in comparison to the severe penalties available under
federal law for child pornography offenses. Limiting conviction to those who actually knew
that their pornographic material featured minors thus serves to guarantee that the conduct
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proposed here would make it more likely that courts presented with mens
rea selection issues in the future would do likewise.
CONCLUSION
Federal criminal offenses should be defined to ensure that no one
will be condemned as a criminal unless his or her conduct was both
morally blameworthy and sufficiently blameworthy to merit the
punishments provided by Congress. The requirement of a "guilty mind"
is an important reflection of the criminal law's lofty aspirations in this
regard. In its pronouncements concerning federal mens rea doctrine over
the last several decades, the Supreme Court has taken giant strides
towards ensuring that "innocence," in the moral sense of that term, will
be protected against conviction-not merely left to the whims of
prosecutorial discretion-and it deserves great credit for doing so.
Still, current mens rea doctrine does not go far enough toward the
goal of aligning punishment and blameworthiness. What the Court fails
to realize, and must realize if the goals of mens rea doctrine are to be fully
realized, is that "innocence" necessarily incorporates considerations of
proportionality of punishment. Commission of a blameworthy act is
merely the first of two culpability-related inquiries. It is also necessary to
ask whether the conduct charged was sufficiently blameworthy to
warrant the penalties afforded by the relevant statute. If the conduct was
only minimally blameworthy, to impose severe penalties for that conduct
would be to visit upon the defendant more punishment than is deserved.
"Innocence" will never be fully protected until courts recognize, as hinted
in Elonis, that mens rea must aim to guarantee both culpability and
proportionality of punishment for every federal crime.
The Court should reject the excessive literalism that has crept into
mens rea doctrine. Congress needs and expects the assistance of the
courts in limiting criminal liability to appropriate bounds, especially in
fleshing out the elusive but important mens rea requirements of federal
crimes. Courts should embrace, rather than shy away from, that salutary
role. Apart from situations in which Congress has textually foreclosed a
particular mens rea option, courts should be free, and not in the least
reluctant, to impose any standard of mental culpability-including
knowledge of the criminal law-that is necessary to render the
authorized punishment just. To do anything less would be to allow
morally undeserved punishment, which any criminal justice system
worthy of the name should strive to avoid.
that can lead to conviction for federal child pornography offenses will be sufficiently
blameworthy to deserve the severe penalties available for those offenses.
Smith, supra note 11, at 139-40 (footnotes omitted).
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